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I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF NON-DISABILITY RETIRED PAY
The first major non-disability retirement act dates back
to August of 1 861 . This Act provided for the voluntary
retirement of regular officers of all branches of the service,
at the discretion of the President, after they served 4-0 years
of duty. In 1870, for Army and Marine Corps officers, and
1873 for Navy officers, Congress established voluntary retire-
ment for officers after 30 years of service upon approval of
the President and set retired pay at 75 percent of pay of the
officers grade at time of retirement.
The first non-disability retirement act for enlisted personnel
in the Army and Marine Corps was enacted in 1885. This law
authorized voluntary retirement after 30 years of service and
fixed retired pay at 75 percent of pay of the grade in which
retired plus an allowance in lieu of quarters, fuel and light.
The Navy enlisted personnel received this same entitlement in
1899.
In 1916 two new principles for the non-disability retirement
system were enacted. The first established an up-or-out
selective promotion plan with selection boards for promotion
to Commander, Captain, and Rear Admiral on the basis of age-
in-grade. A Captain who failed to be selected for promotion
by the time he reached age 56, or a Commander by age 50, or
a Lieutenant Commander by age 4-5, became ineligible for further
8

consideration and had to be retired. The second principle
enacted in 1916 was the use of the 2.5 percent formula for
retirement compensation. This principle provided that officers
who were retired for failure to be promoted were entitled to
retired pay of 2.5 percent of the shore duty pay for his grade
for each year of service up to a maximum of 30 years.
Congress changed the voluntary retirement provisions for
Navy and Marine Corps officers in 1938 to allow for retirement
after 20 years of service at the discretion of the President.
Retired pay was computed by the standard 2.5 percent formula,
not to exceed 75 percent of pay. It was not until ten years
later, wnen the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement
Equalization Act of 194-8 established 20 years as the minimum
requirement for voluntary retirement, that the Armv and Air
Force were put Dn a per with the Navy and Marine Cores. This
law resulted, for the first time in history, in uniform
voluntary retirement authority for officers of all branches
of the service ( DOD, 1976; DOD, 1981 ).
3. THE PRESENT RETIREMENT PROVISIONS
Today's military retirement system is a defined benefit
system which authorizes voluntary non-disability retirement
after 20 years of active military service, subject to the
approval of the Service Secretary. The retiree receives 2.5
percent of active duty base pay for each year of service up
to a ceiling of 75 percent of base pay. For the retiree who
first became a member of the military before 8 September 1980

final basic pay is used to compute retired pay. For those who
became members on or after that date base pay for retired pay
computation is equal to the average of the member's highest
36 months of basic pay (DOD, 1976; DOD, 1979; AEILA, 1980).
The olan also takes into account annual changes for inflation
through cost-of-living adjustments that are tied to the consumer
price index. The adjustment, which becomes effective annually
on March 1st, is computed by calculating the percentage increase
(adjusted to the nearest 1/10 of one percent) between the two
previous December consumer price indexes. The revised CPI for
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers is used for determining
the military retirement cost-of-living increase (DOD, 1981).
C. PURPOSE OF RETIRED PAY
The military retirement system plays a major role in the
military's manpower management program. As a part of the
management plan, it serves as an integral part of the compensa-
tion package which is designed to help attract and retain
qualified personnel in the service (DOD, July 1982). The
military retirement system is not merely an old age pension
plan but is designed to complement the personnel management
requirements of the Armed Forces and to help maintain a strong
and ready force (AEILA, 1980). A purpose of the early voluntary
retirement provision (20 year retirements) is to keep the force
young and to reward those who have successfully completed 20
years of military service. Those who do retire are not
retired in the traditional sense of the word, but are retained
10

in a military status being subject to the Uniformed Code of
Military Justice and subject to recall to active duty (DOD,
1981 ).
The purpose of military retired pay is set forth by the
Department of Defense in its Military Compensation Background
Papers (1982). Their stated reasons for today's non-disability
retirement system are: (1) to insure that the choice of career
service in the military is competitive with private sector
alternatives, (2) to insure that promotion opportunities are
kept open for young and able members, (3) to insure a measure
of economic security for military personnel after retirement
from active service, and (4-) to insure a pool of experienced
personnel subject to recall to active duty during time of war
or national emergency exists.
The accounting basis used for allocating retired pay costs
to a period or periods of time can either be cash basis or
accrual basis of accounting (Hicks, 1965). Accrual basis is the
method of accounting by which revenues and expenses are measured
and reported in the period in which they are incurred without
regard to the date that they are paid. In contrast, cash basis
is the method of accounting whereby revenue and expense recog-
nition depends solely on the timing of cash receipts and
disbursements without regard to the period to which they apply
(Welsch and Anthony, 1981).
11

Throughout the history of the military retirement system,
retired costs have been financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with
funds for current year payments being appropriated annually
(AEILA, 1930). Pay-as-you-go financing is the same as cash,
basis accounting because expenses are not recognized when
incurred but when the payment is due. Under the present cash
basis of accounting;, the retired pay expense that is recognized
in any specific year is the amount that is actually paid to
those members who receive retired pay in that year (Munnell,
1979).
For fiscal year 1981 1.1 million non-disability retirees
received retired appropriation outlays totalling $12.5 billion.
The average monthly gross receipt for all non-disabled officers
was $1,751 and $761 a month for non-disabled enlisted retirees
(DOD, 1 Q 80.
With retired pay being budgeted on a past-services basis,
the retirement costs of military personnel often do not appear
in the budget until many years later when the member actually
retires from active service. The fallacy with this procedure
is that it does not adequately recognize the future cost of
the present force (Canby, 1972). In accessing the disadvantages
of the pay-as-you-go method of accounting, the Congressional
Budget Office (1977) stated:
Under the present accounting system, the defense function
includes retirement costs of former military employees who
do not contribute to today's defense, but it includes no
charges at all for current military employees who are
participating in today's defense (p. 13).
12

Anthony and Herzinger (1980) further point out that:
Failure to record pension costs in the year in which they are
incurred is one of the most serious weaknesses in State and
Local government accounting systems (p. 196).
This applies to the military retirement system as well.
Omitting retired pay not only understates the costs of the
current military force, but it also puts the burden of paying
for retired costs on future generations, rather than on the
current generation which receives the benefit of the Armed Forces
In order to recognize the total cost of retired pay to the tax-
payer a method of allocation must be used to distribute the
cost of retirement over the members years of active service
{Professional Standards, 1975). Without this
. . .the DOD, it is claimed, has no incentive to consider
the retirement costs that will result from decisions concerning
today's manpower requirements (AEILA, 1980, p. 3).
Along with being budgeted and paid for on a yearly basis,
the military retirement plan also has the characteristics of
being a non-funded and non-contributory defined benefit pension
plan. The main features of these characteristics are discussed:
1 . Non-Funded. A non-funded plan is one in which no cash
reserve is set aside to meet retirement benefit obligations
when they become due. As retired pay obligations become
payable, they are paid out of current year appropriations
(Greenough and King, 1976).
A funded plan is one in which assets are accumulated for
the purpose of meeting retirement benefits when they become due
(Hicks, 1965). The funding of private pension plans is a
requirement established by the Employee Retirement Income
13

Security Act (ERISA) of 19 74-. Minimum funding standards are
set for defined benefit plans for the primary purpose of
insuring the plan's present and future ability to pay the
benefits when due (Matz and Usry, 1930). Private pension
plans have a need to accumulate funds to pay retirement benefits
since they do not have the power to tax or the security of
continued existence. In contrast, it has been argued (DOD,
1976) that the Federal Government with its power to tax,
does not have to accumulate funds to insure that benefits
will be available to retirees at a future date.
If the Federal Government were to adopt funding practices
for their retirement program accumulation of reserves would
not necessarily follow. Munnell ( 1 979 ) contends that unless
taxes are increased or total expenditures decreased by the
amount needed to fund payments, the funding practice would be
nothing more than a paper transaction between the Treasury
and the military retirement fund.
2. Non-contributory. A non-contributory plan is one in
which the employee makes no contribution to the pension fund.
Since its inception, the military retirement system has been
non-contributory. The Military Compensation Background Papers
(1976) list four reasons for contributions by employees:
(1) Lower direct costs to employer; (2) Possibility that a
higher level of benefit will derive if the cost is shared
by the employee; (3) A greater appreciation of the benefits
of the plan by the employees if they share in the costs;
U

(4.) A perception by the employees that they have a contractual
right to their pension if they help pay for it.
Three major studies have dealt with the issue of whether
the military retirement system should remain non-contributory.
The Hook Commission in 194-3, and a Study Committee of the
University of Michigan in 1961, recommended that a contributory
plan for the military retirement system should not be adopted.
The third study, The First Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation, recommended in 1967 that a retirement contribution
should be collected from military personnel (DCD, 1976).
The Hook Commission in its recommendation stated that the
non- contributory plan had been traditional in the military and
was particularly suited to a Government agency. They argued
that if a contributory plan was adopted it would require increased
expense to administer the program and little if any actual
savings would be realized through military contributions
(DOD, 1976).
The University of Michigan Study Committee concluded that:
(1
)
under an pension plan employee contributions traditionally
make up only a small portion of the retirement benefit costs;
(2) where contributory plans are used, pay raises to cover part
or all of the contribution are quite often given to off-set
any reduction in take-home pay caused by the plan; (3) adminis-
trative costs associated with running an enormous number of
savings to bank accounts would off-set, or possibly even overwhelm,
any savings. For these reasons, the Committee recommended
against contributions by military members (DOD, 1976).
15

The First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation in
recommending in favor of a contributory plan concluded that,
under the present system, military personnel are making an
implicit contribution to their retirement through the vehicle
of reduced basic pay rates in lieu of direct contributions.
The review argued that this imputed contribution is inequitable
to those members who do not serve to retirement. Through an
explicit contribution plan the member who terminates service
prior to retirement could collect his portion of the contribution
(DOD, 1976).
3. Defined Benefit Plan. Most pension plans are either
defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans. A defined
benefit plan determines in advance the amount of pension benefit
an employee will receive when he retires. The amount contri-
buted to the fund varies. A defined contribution plan has a
fixed contribution amount but the actual amount of benefits
the employee receives at retirement is not known. The amount
received at retirement is determined by the money that has
accumulated in the employees account at retirement (DOL, 1979).
The military retirement system is a defined benefit plan
in that benefits derived from the plan are predetermined and
guaranteed to the retiree. Each service member who remains
on active duty for 20 years knows that his retired pay will be
equal to 2.5 percent of his base pay for each year of service





The objective of this thesis is to evaluate alternative
methods for allocating military retired pay costs. Primarily,
it will look at hox^ non-disability retirement costs should be
allocated so that they reflect the full cost to the taxpayer
associated with defense manpower decisions.
In recent years the issue of the military's pay-as-you-go
basis of accounting for retirement costs has been addressed
by the Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting-
Office (AEILA, 1930). There is growing support for changing
the method of accounting for retired pay from pay-as-you-go
basis to accrual basis so that the full cost of military
manpower decisions will be apparent to the Administration.
It is felt that this increased visibility of the cost of
retirement benefits might make defense planners more frugal
in their use of military manpower (CBO, 1978).
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) recognize
accrual basis accounting as the only fair presentation of pension
costs in financial statements (Hicks, 1965). Therefore, in
accessing allocation methods, private and public sector handling
of pension costs under accrual basis accounting will be studied
to determine their applicability to the military retirement
system.
Ultimately, the author's goal is to recommend an allocation






Chapter II provides a discussion of some basic concepts
and ideas associated with cost allocation. The allocation
problem is initially discussed in Section B from a theoretical
view point followed by a discussion in Section C as to why
indirect costs are allocated even though there is no theoretical
justification for it. Conventional methods for allocating costs
under accrual basis accounting are presented in Section D.
Section E presents the reader with the Accounting Principle
Board's position on the use of accrual basis in accounting for
pension costs. The board supports the use of actuarial cost
methods in handling pension costs and Section F presents the
reader with some basic terminology and characteristics of
actuarial cost methods. Section G through K discuss separately
the unit credit, entry age normal, individual level premium,
aggregate and attained age normal actuarial cost methods for
accounting for pension costs.
B. ALLOCATION THEORY
In discussing allocation theory one must first define what
the word theory represents when applied to accounting.
Hendriksen (1970) states:
. . .accounting theory may be defined as logical reasoning
in the form of a set of broad principles that (1) provide a
general frame of reference by which accounting practice can
be evaluated and (2) guide the development of new practices
and procedures, (p. 1).

Allocation is the assignment of costs of individual inputs
or groups of inputs to the firm including the assignment, to
individual periods of time, divisions, and products. In looking
at methods of allocation two types of costs must be considered:
direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs are those costs
which can be identified directly with a cost objective, i.e.,
a department, function, or activity. Conversely, indirect costs
are those costs which cannot be identified with a single cost
objective, but which are incurred for the benefit of more than
one department, function, or activity (Matz and Usry, 1930).
The allocation of direct costs is straight forward. Since
there is a demonstrable and immediate relationship between the
cost and cost objective, the cost is directly applied to that
objective. As an example, salary paid to a welder in an auto-
mobile factory is a direct cost which may be assigned by direct
application to that production department (Beckett, 1951).
In contrast, the relationship of indirect costs to the cost
objective is not as easily determined and as a result, the
allocation of indirect costs is one of the most controversial
practices in accounting (Fremgen and Liao, 1981). A method
used for the allocation of indirect costs employs the approach
of accumulating indirect costs in cost pools and then allocating
these costs to cost objectives on the basis of benefit. An
example of this type of allocation is the accumulation of
lighting and heating costs in a common pool and then allocating
these costs to departments on the basis of the square footage
19

occupied by individual departments (Beckett, 1951). In practice,
this type of allocation of indirect costs is widely used,
however, many authors question the validity of any indirect
cost allocations at all. Thomas (1976) maintains that in order
for an indirect cost allocation method to be justifiable it
must meet the following minimum requirements:
1. The method used should be unambiguous. It should
provide clear instructions, in advance, as to how the allocation
should be applied.
2. The method should be defendable. To be defendable, it
should be demonstrated that a particular allocation method is
better than all ether possible alternatives. For instance,
in financial accounting whatever approach that one adopts for
allocation there usually will be a variety of conflicting
alternative methods, all of which appear to be consistent with
what one is trying to accomplish. However, at present there
seems to be no way of conclusively defending one choice over
the other.
3. The allocation should be additive. The method used
should divide up the total of what is available, no more or
no less.
In discussing allocation Thomas further contends that
almost all allocations presently made are arbitrary and
incorrigible and no solution to the problem is possible within
the present framework of allocation theory or conventional
rules. They are considered to be arbitrary because they are
20

made on the basis of someone 's opinion as to how they should be
apportioned and not on the basis of theoretical evidence.
They are incorrigible because it is impossible to prove that
they are either correct or incorrect (Thomas, 197.4).
In allocating indirect costs over time different schemes
may be used in apportioning costs to individual years, i.e.,
level portions, decreasing portions, or increasing portions.
The appropriateness of the allocation method used in matching
the cost with the benefit depends on the judgement of the
people selecting the allocation method. The most that can be
expected from such an allocation basis is that it is intuitively
reasonable. Unfortunately, reasonable people may make different
judgements on any given allocation and therefore there is no
basis for defending the method of allocation selected (Fremgen
and Liao, 1 931 )
.
It can be concluded from Thomas' studies that there is
no theoretical justification for allocation of indirect costs
over time. However, it is not necessarily wrong to make
arbitrary allocations as long as the allocations are not treated
as being theoretically justified. Accountants should explicitly
acknov/ledge that all allocations are arbitrarily made and thus
respond in an appropriate way to this awareness (Thomas, 1976).
C. WHY ALLOCATE?
If allocations cannot be justified on a theoretical basis,
then why do accountants allocate indirect costs? So far as
21

the accounting procedures are concerned, indirect cost allocation;
are made in practice because management preceives a need for them
(Fremgen and Liao, 1981).
Thomas (1971) concedes that there are circumstances in
which allocations of indirect costs may be useful to users of
accounting data even though the allocations are arbitrarily
made. Two categories of allocations which Thomas feels that
are totally ambiguous and theoretically unjustified, yet which
perhaps may be useful to an entity, are:
1. Allocations which are required by laws, regulations,
and customs. Allocations of these types become automatically
useful in that they satisfy a requirement.
2. Mutually satisfactory allocations. In this type of
allocation the common cause of two or more entities are served.
Fremgen and Liao (1931) suggest four possible reasons




Financial Reporting. For financial reporting the
primary purpose for allocating indirect costs is to insure a
realistic valuation of inventories, and therefore a realistic
measurement of profits.
2. Planning and Decision Making. Cost allocation assists
the decision maker in determining what costs will be in the
future as a result of decisions made today.
3. Pricing. Cost allocations are used to set appropriate
selling prices. For this purpose, allocation is important in
22

that it makes the product bear its share of indirect costs
which management feels is necessary to warrant continuation of
the product line in the long run.
4.. Control and Performance Evaluation. Cost allocations
are made for the purpose of influencing the managers behavior
with respect to costs by assigning them responsibility for a
portion of the cost. The usefulness of cost allocations as a
tool for controlling and evaluating performance is a controversial
issue. Some writers maintain that it is effective and others
argue that it has a detrimental effect. Demski (1976) suggests
that when cost allocations are used for control and performance
evaluations one must be careful to ensure that the manager is
only held responsible for those aspects of performance that he
has control over. He should not be evaluated on the basis of
out comes w hi ch are influenced bv outside factors that he has
no control over nor on results that are influenced by the
actions of other managers. Evaluations that are based on
noncontrollable aspects may prove to be dysfunctional instead
of providing the desired motivation to improve performance.
Therefore, care should be taken in deciding on what is or is
not controllable by the manager.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) supports the allocation of indirect costs stating
that if a benefit is provided for more than one period, then
its costs should be allocated to the periods in a systematic
and rational manner. Since the allocation always involves
23

assumptions about the relationship between costs and benefits,
the method selected for use should appear reasonable to an
unbiased observer (Professional Standards, 1975).
In summary, allocation of indirect costs continues to be
employed by accountants because it fulfills a need (actual
or perceived) for assigning costs to cost objectives or periods
of time.
D. CONVENTIONAL ALLOCATION METHODS
Cost allocation is fundamentally a problem of linking some
cost or groups of costs with cost objectives within a period or
with time periods. Linking costs with cost objectives tfithir
a period entails allocating costs to products, departments, and
segments of a firm. Types of costs allocated in this manner are
factory overhead costs, service center costs, and general and
administrative costs (Fremgen and Liao, 1981). The allocation
of costs among cost objectives within a period is used in cost
accounting for the four purposes discussed in the preceding
section; financial reporting, planning and decision making,
pricing, and control and performance evaluation. Allocation of
costs to cost objectives within time periods is not considered
any further in this study.
The second type of allocation, the linking of costs with
cost objectives among time periods , is simply the spreading
of costs over time. Examples of this type of allocation are
depreciation or amortization of long term assets (Fremgen and
Liao, 1981). It is this second concept of allocation which plays
a major role in accrual basis accounting and that is used in the
allocation of pension costs.
2k

Allocation of costs under accrual basis accounting involves
matching expenses as closely as possible with revenue. Expenses
are the costs that are associated with the revenue of the period.
Costs which are associated with future revenue or otherwise
linked to future accounting periods are deferred to future
periods as assets. Costs which are associated with past revenue
or otherwise linked with past accounting periods are treated as
adjustments of expenses of those periods (Professional Standards,
1975). Three expense recognition principles used for recog-
nizing expenses as costs are set forth in APB Statement No. /+:
1. Associating cause and effect. Under this principle
costs are recognized as expenses on the basis of a presumed
direct association with specific revenue.
2. Systematic and rational allocation. This principle
c^i+o
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then its cost should be allocated to the periods in a systematic
and rational manner in the absence of a more direct basis for
associating cause and effect.
3. Immediate recognition. Under this principle costs are
recognized as expenses in the current accounting period because
(a) costs incurred provide no discernable benefit to the future,
(b) costs incurred in prior periods no longer provide discernable
benefit, or (c) allocating costs on the basis of cause and effect
or among several accounting periods serves no useful purpose.
In applying the expense recognition principles costs are
first analyzed to see whether they are associated with revenue
25

on the basis of cause and effect. If not, then allocation is
attempted through systematic and rational means. Finally, if
neither cause and effect nor systematic and rational allocations
can be made, then costs are recognized as expenses in the period
in which they are incurred (Professional Standards, 1975).
E. THE ALLOCATION OF PENSION COSTS
The total cost of providing retirement benefits to employees
is recognized as an expense of operating the business. The
assignment of these costs to periods is considered to be a
major problem of accounting for the cost of pensions. The use
of accrual basis accounting in allocating these costs is
strongly supported by the AICPA. In Accounting Research
Study No. 3 the Accounting Principles Board states:
It is a conclusion of this study that an employer's financial
position and results of operations, to the extent affected
by the cost of a pension plan, are fairly presented only if
such cost is stated on the accrual basis (p. 3S).
In arriving at this conclusion the following arguments were
set forth:
1. Pension plans play a major role in an employer's ability
to obtain and retain quality employees. It is considered a
part of compensation in the form of deferred retirement payments
and as such its costs should be charged to current periods
when incurred, not future periods when paid.
2. Zven if pensions were not considered as part of compen-
sation, it still is an employment cost which should be accounted
for when incurred, not when oaid.
26

3. Employers may properly contribute more to pension funds
during good years and less during lean years. By accounting for
pension costs on the basis of the amount paid to the fund
instead of on the accrual basis yearly expenses can be manipu-
lated to alter net income significantly.
i. Under the consistency concept, pension costs should
be derived in the same manner from year to year and should
not be arbitrarily determined on the basis of how well the firm'
financial position was for the year.
Under accrual basis accounting, the process of allocating
pension costs to periods is similar to the handling of deprecia-
tion of machinery and equipment except that the cost of depre-
ciable assets are determined by current or past transactions and
prices, while pension costs are measured in terms of expected
cash outlays in the future (Hendricksen, 19 7 0). The total cost
of pension plans to be allocated is measured in terms of
expected cash outlays in the future. These costs are somewhat
uncertain in thaL the amount to be paid depends on several
future events such as; the employee leaving the firm before
retirement or vesting, the employee dying before retirement,
and how long the employee lives after retirement. Actuarial
methods can generally be used to resolve these uncertainties
and therefore pension costs are usually computed by an actuary
(Hendricksen, 1970).
Currently, actuarial cost methods are the acceptable means
of allocating pension costs under accrual basis accounting.
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Pay-as-you-go and terminal funding methods are unacceptable
because they do not recognize pension costs until the employees
actually retire (Hicks, 1965). The actuarial cost method used
for determining pension costs for accounting, purposes must be
rationally and systematically applied, on a consistent basis ,
so that it results in a reasonable measure of pension costs from
year to year (Professional Standards, 1975).
F. ACTUARIAL COST METHODS
A number of actuarial cost methods (also called funding
methods) have been developed for accounting for pension costs.
The Accounting Principles Beard in Accounting Research Study
No. 8 explicitly endorsed the following actuarial cost methods;
the accrual benefit (or unit cost) method, the entry age normal
method, the individual level premium method, the aggregate method
and the attained age normal method. Most of these methods were
designed primarily as funding techniques but they also may be
used in determining pension costs for accounting purposes.
The major characteristics of each of these methods will be
discussed separately in later sections.
In selecting the actuarial cost method to be used one should
keep in mind that the cost method selected should result in a
systematic and rational allocation of the total cost of pensions
among the employees' years of active service (Phoenix and
Bosse, August 1967). Additionally, for any given actuarial cost
method employed, the actuarial determinations of pension costs
are necessarily estimates since the actuary must make many
28

assumptions about future events. These assumptions are called
actuarial assumptions (Hicks, 1965). Dreher (1967) lists the
following actuarial assumptions as the most frequently used in
the valuation basis of a pension plan:
1
.
The expected rate of return on present and future
investments. The assumed rate can have a major impact on the
present value of the fund. A § percent actual variation from
the assumed interest rate can have as much as a 10 to 15 percent
change in pension cost accrual in later years.
2. Expected future compensation levels of employees. The
actuary makes an estimate of the normal increases expected
from the employee's movement through the various earning-rate
categories, based on the employee's experience.
3. Mortality of employees both before and after retirement.
These estimates are based on mortality tables.
4.. The expected retirement age of the employee.
5. The number of employees who will withdraw from the plan
before becoming eligible for vesting or retirement.
In practice, actuarial assumptions do not change a pension
plan's ultimate cost, but they do have an important effect on
current estimates of pension costs. Therefore, the selection
of the particular set of assumptions to be used should be based
on the facts and circumstances of each pension plan and employee
group. Within the same pension plan, it is not unusual to use
different assumptions for subgroups of the organization. As
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an example, the assumed mortality rates, turnover rates, and
salary scales may differ between military officers and enlisted
personnel (Dreher, 1967).
Before examining the various actuarial methods available
some key terminology are discussed:
Accrued Actuarial Liability. That portion, as determined
by a particular actuarial cost method, of the actuarial present
value of pension plan benefits and expenses which is not provided
for by future normal costs.
Actuarial Cost Method. A particular technique for determining
the amount and incidence of annual pension plan benefits and
expenses and for developing an actuarially equivalent allocation
of such values to time periods.
Actuarial Gains or Losses. A measure of the difference
between actual experience and that expected based upon a set
of actuarial assumptions.
Actuarial Present Value. The present value of an amount or
series of amounts payable or receivable in the future. The
present value is determined by discounting the future amount
or amounts at a predetermined rate of interest as set by a
particular set of actuarial assumptions.
Actuarial Value of Assets. The value of cash investments
and other property belonging to a pension fund.
Normal Cost. It is the annual pension cost assigned to
years subsequent to the inception of the pension plan or a
change in the plan.
30

Past Service Cost. The pension cost assigned to years prior
to the inception of the pension plan.
Prior Service Cost. When there is a change in the plan,
it is the portion of the cost assigned to prior years (including
any remaining past service cost).
Unfunded Accrued Actuarial Liability. The difference
between actuarial accrued liability and actuarial value of
assets
.
Valuation. The process used by an actuary to estimate the
present value of benefits to be paid under a pension plan.
It calculates the amount of employer contributions or accounting
charges for pension cost,. (Hicks, 1965; FASB, 1960; Professional
Standard, 1975; Hendrickson, 1970; NCGA, 1982).
G. UNIT CREDIT ACTUARIAL COST METHOD
Under the unit credit actuarial cost method future pension
benefits based on service after the inception of a plan are
funded as they accrue. This method is referred to as an accrued
benefit cost method since it recognizes the costs of benefits
only when they have accrued. The normal cost, as determined
under this olan for a siven year, is the oresent value of the
units of future benefit credited to an employee for that year's
service (Professional Standards, 1975).
The past service cost under the unit cost method is determined
and treated separately. Its cost is the present value at the
plan's inception date of the units of future benefit credited
to employees on the basis of service prior to the date of
inception of the pension plan (Hicks, 1965).
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There are differing viewpoints as to how past service costs
should be handled. Some believe that past service costs should
be amortized in equal annual amounts (including interest) over
a period of at least 15 years, but not more than 4-0 years
(Dreher, 1967). Others believe that if the pension plan is
expected to continue in existence indefinitely, then there is
no need to provide for anything more than interest on unfunded
past service costs. Those supporting the latter approach
contend that the annual normal cost contribution plus interest
on the past service cost will eventually accumulate assets that
will be equal to the actuarial value of all accrued benefits
and therefore the security of the employee's pension expecta-
tions will be satisfied (Dreher, 1967). The Accounting
Principles Board concluded that either approach is acceptable.
As a result any period may be selected for amortisation of past
service cost as long as the total annual provision falls
between a minimum and maximum allowable amount. The minimum
amount is the normal cost plus interest on the unfunded past
service cost. The maximum amount is the normal cost plus 10
percent of the past service cost plus interest on the unfunded
past service cost (Phoenix and Bosse, August 1967).
For normal costs, an amount is determined and contributed
each year for each individual employee to provide for the
benefits attributable to that year's employment service. For
the individual employee, the annual normal cost for an equal
unit of benefit increases each year because as the period to
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retirement shortens, contributions to a fund have a shorter
period to produce income, employee earnings generally tend to
increase, and the probability of reaching retirement increases.
However, the combined cost of all employees tends to change
only as the average characteristics of the entire work force
change since older employees who generate the highest annual
cost are continually replaced by new employees who generate
the lowest cost (Ganner and Kingsbery , 1 966) . For a mature work
force, the normal cost for the entire group tends to be the
same from year to year (Hicks, 196$)
.
under the unit credit actuarial cost method as well as with
the projected benefit cost methods, actuarial gains and losses
arise from changes in the assumptions concerning future events
used in pension ccst estimates. The actuarial gain or loss is
determined by taking the difference between the actuarial
assumptions and the actual results. In dealing with these
gains and losses the main concern is with the timing of their
recognition as a pension cost (Phoenix and Bosse, October 1967)
Three alternative methods of handling actuarial gains and
losses have been used: immediate recognition, spreading and
averaging. The immediate recognition method is not ordinarily
used when dealing with losses, but is used for applying net
gains. Under this method, net gains are used to reduce the
pension cost in the year of occurrence or the following year.
As a result, pension costs may sometimes be substantially
reduced or even completely eliminated for one or more years.
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Under the spreading method, annual actuarial gains and losses
are applied to both current and future costs over a period of
10 to 20 years. As an example, a $5000 gain could be spread
over 10 years by applying $500 to the current year and
deferring $4-500 to future years. The averaging method involves
taking an average of annual gains and losses for a pre-determined
number of years and applying that sum to the current year. As
an example, during a five year period gains and losses were
as follows: $1000, $4-000, ($2000), $3000, and $5000. The sum
for the five years, $11,000, divided by the number of years, 5,
results in $2200 to be applied to the current year. The remaining
$2800 ($5000 minus $2200) of the current year's gain would be
deferred to future years (Professional Standards, 19 7 5).
Under the unit credit cost method actuarial gains are
normally recognized on the immediate basis because the Internal
Revenue Service requires that these gains be used to reduce the
maximum pension cost deduction for the year following the
determination. Actuarial losses under this method are normally
added to unfunded past service cost.
The unit credit cost method is almost always used when
annuity contracts, trusteed plans , or deposit administration
contracts are the funding instrument and the benefits are a
stated amount per year of service. The method is seldom used
when the benefit is a fixed amount or when the current year's




H. ENTRY AGE NORMAL METHOD
The entry age normal along with the individual level
premium, aggregate, and attained age normal, are the commonly
recognized projected benefit cost methods. In contrast to the
accrued benefit cost method (unit credit method), the projected
benefit cost methods look forward. Projected benefit cost
methods assign the entire cost of an employee's projected
benefits to past, present and future periods without regard
to the period during which the service on which the benefits
are based has been or will be rendered (Professional Standards,
1975).
Under the entry age normal method, the assumption is made
that (1) every employee entered the plan at the time that
individual started work or at the earliest time that the
individual would have been eligible if the plan had then been
in existence, and (2) contributions have been made on this basis
from the entry age to the date of the actuarial valuation
(Hicks, 1965).
The contributions are level annual amounts which, if
accumulated at the rate of interest used in actuarial valuation,
would result in sufficient funds being available at an employee's
retirement date to provide for the pension in full. The normal
cost under this method represents the level amount to be
contributed for each year (Hicks, 1965).
Past service cost evolves when the plan is established
after the company has been in existence for some time. Under
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the entry age normal method, past service cost at the plan's
inception date is the theoretical amount that would have been
accumulated in the fund had yearly contributions equal to the
normal cost been made in prior years. In years succeeding the
plans inception, past service cost is usually frozen, that is,
the unfunded amount of such cost is changed only to recognize
payments and the accrual of interest. Actuarial gains and
losses are therefore spread only to the future by becoming
part of the normal cost for future years (Professional Standards,
1975).
The total annual contribution under the entry age normal
method is normally made up of the normal cost and an amount
for past service cost. The past service cost may be comprised
of an amount equal to interest on the unfunded balance or it
may include interest plus amortization of principle. The
considerations in determining fhe past service payment are
basically the same as those used for the unit credit actuarial
cost method. The entry age normal method is commonly used
when a trust agreement or deposit administration contract is
the funding instrument (Hicks, 1965).
I. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL PREMIUM METHOD
Under the individual level premium method the entire cost
of each individual employee's pension is assigned in annual
level amounts, or as a level percentage of the employee's
compensation, from the date of entry of that employee into the
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plan (or, for a new plan, from the inception date) to retirement.
No past service liability is determined separately, however, since
this cost is included in the normal cost the initial annual cost
may be very high. The reason for the high initial cost is due
to past service cost for employees, who are close to retirement
at the inception of the plan, being in effect spread over a
short period. The annual cost ultimately drops to the level of
the normal cost determined under the entry age normal plan
(Hicks, 1965).
The individual level premium method is used most often when
individual insurance or annuitv oolicies are the funding
instrument. Actuarial losses are not normally recognized under
this method since premiums paid are not ordinarily subject to
retroactive increases. Actuarial gains are normally passed
on to the employer in the form of reduced premiums for the
next period (Professional Standards, 1975).
J. AGGREGATE METHOD
The aggregate method is basically the same as the individual
level premium method except it is applied on a collective
basis. The entire cost of future pension benefits, including
benefits to be paid to employees who have already retired, is
spread over the average future working period of all employees
who are on the work force at the date of valuation. This is
normally done by using a percentage of payroll (Hicks, 1965).
As compared to the individual level method, the averaging
in this method tends to reduce the high initial cost but it also
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increases the later costs somewhat because the total past
service cost is funded in level amounts over the average
future service lives of employees rather than in gradually-
decreasing amounts (Ganner and Kingsbery, 1966).
The aggregate method is used mainly with trust fund plans
and with plans funded under deposit administration contracts.
Under this method, actuarial gains and losses are handled
by spreading them over future periods (Hicks, 1965).
K. ATTAINED AGS NORMAL METHOD
The attained age method is similar to the aggregate method
or individual level premium method except that past service
liability is treated separately in all funding arrangements.
The cost of benefits assigned to years after the inception of
the plan is spread over the remaining average service life of
employees in the work force at the date of valuation. Under
this method normal cost contributions are normally determined
as a percentage of payroll (Ganner and Kingsbery, 1966).
Considerations in determining annual past service cost
contributions are the same as those used for the unit credit
and entry age normal methods. The past service cost may be
comprised of an amount equal to interest on the unfunded balance
or it may include interest plus amortization of principle. The
attained age normal method is used with trusteed plans and
deposit administration contracts (Hicks, 1965).
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III. PRIVATE PENSION PLANS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter III presents the pension plans of the private sector.
Sections B and C discuss how pensions have evolved in the private
sector and provide some of the reasons for recognizing retirement
benefits as part of employee compensation. The remainder of the
chapter discusses the different characteristics of a typical
private pension plan and hew the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974- affects each. The characteristics discussed
are: participation eligibility, retirement ages, vesting,
benefits, accounting basis, and insurance.
3. EARLY PRIVATE PENSION PLANS
Private pension plans in the united States date back to
1875 when the first formal plan was established by the American
Express Company. Though established at this early date,
pension plans only covered about 3 to 4- million workers before
1935. The voluntary retirement age for these early plans ranged
from age 70 for railroad plans to either 60 or 65 years of age
after 20 or 25 years of service for the typical manufacturing
pension plan. Most of these plans were non-contributory and
non-funded, and none of the early pension plans included
vesting (Greenough and King, 1976).
Private pension plans were initially viewed as a "social
responsibility" of industry to provide older employees with
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adequate retired pay. Since most plans were financed on a
pay-as-you-go basis, the benefits to the employee could not
be o-uaranteed. Tn fact, most plans expressed good intentions
of rewarding employees for long and faithful service but the
plans were very careful in making it clear that the employee
had no contractual right to pension benefits. Logue (1979)
states that a typical disclaimer of liability was on the order
of:
This pension plan is a voluntary act on the part of the
company and is not to be deemed or construed to be a part of
any contract of employment, or as giving any employee an
enforceable right against the company. The board of directors
of the company reserves the right to alter, amend, or annul
or cancel the plan or any part of it at any time. The right
of the company to discharge any employee at any time shall
not be affected by this plan, nor shall such employee have
any interest in any pension after discharge (p. 17).
This type of disclaimer was upheld in several court cases and
thus one can only conclude that early pension plans were
administered through the good-will of the employer showing
gratitude for long and faithful service of the employee by
rewarding them financially in their old age.
In the late 194-O's the Deferred Wage Theory of pensions
was gradually recognized. According to Logue (1979), the
theory was based on the premise that the worker's interest in
pension plans was not based solely on reasons of old age and
long and faithful service. It was believed that pensions
were attractive to employees because of the tax advantage
they received by deferring a portion of their wages until they
retired. Under defined contribution plans it was felt that
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if an employee was in a lower tax bracket after retirement,
and if expected returns of the pension fund were equal to or
greater than what an individual could expect to achieve, then
employees would be better off by having part of their compen-
sation go into a pension fund (Logue, 1979). A problem with
this viewpoint is that few pension plans vest immediately.
As a result, those employees who do not vest do not receive
full compensation for their labors. Likewise, many pension
plans vary the amount of benefits paid to employees inversely
with their retired social security benefit. Logue (1979)
rejects the deferred wage basis for pension plans arguing that
if pensions were merely deferred wages, then employers would
not have the right to take away wages that the employee had
legitimately earned.
Logue (19^ Q ) views pensions as contingent claims. Since
an employee must normally work for a firm for a specified number
of years before becoming qualified for pension payments
(vested), the employee bears a considerable amount of risk.
At the time of initial employment an employee accepts a contin-
gent claim against the firm. If an employee quits or is fired
before being vested the value of the claim is zero. After
vesting, the value of the claim is determined by an agreed-
upon formula.
As discussed earlier, if pensions were simply deferred wages,
then employees should have the right to immediate vesting.
Since most plans do not provide for immediate vesting, the
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plans must offer something more than a deferred wage to off -set
the risk assumed by vesting requirements. What is offered in
addition to the deferred wage component is benefit sharing
among employees and with the firm.
Benefit sharing among employees is derived from the assumption
that not all employees who are hired will remain with the firm
until vesting or retirement. Therefore, the deferred wages of
those employees who depart early are not paid to them but are
spread among the remaining employees. As a result, employees
who continue until vesting or retirement become entitled to more
benefits than otherwise would have been due them. Benefit
sharing with the firm is derived from employer savings which
are directly attributable to employee contractual arrangements.
This savings is based on the hypothesis that vesting require-
ments and other provisions for pension eligibility reduce the
turnover rate of employees. As a result, a savings is recog-
nized in the form of reduced recruiting and training costs and
a portion of these savings are passed on to the employee through
increased pension benefits (Logue, 1979).
Logue (1979) concludes that employees accept the risk of
receiving part of their compensation in the form of pension
benefits because the firms set aside more for the employee
than the employee would have set aside for themselves if there
were no pension plan.
ia

C. TODAY'S PENSION PLANS
Coverage under private pension plans has increased markedly
over the past two decades. Between 1959 and 1973 the number of
covered workers rose threefold to almost 30 million and as a
result approximately half of the workers employed in the private
sector are now covered by a pension plan (President's Commission,
1981 ).
The rapid expansion of coverage under pension plans brought
with it increased government regulation of pension plans. Even
though the private pension system was well established by the
early 1970's, many potential weaknesses of the plans existed.
As an example, among employees over fifty with ten or more
years of service, only half were fully vested. Some employers
set such stringent vesting and participation requirements that
many workers reached retirement only to discover that because
of some break, in service they were not eligible for pension
benefits (Munnell, 1932). As a result, Congress adopted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974- (ERISA).
The purpose of ERISA is to ensure that protections and guarantees
are provided for employees who are covered by private pension
plans (DOL, 19 76).
The principle features of today's private pension plans
include: disability, death, and survivor benefits; age, service,
and early retirement provisions; vesting provisions; benefit
schedules; and financing arrangements (Logue, 1979). Disability,
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death, and survivor benefits will not be looked at in this
study. The remaining features are discussed in the sections
to follow.
D. PARTICIPATION ELIGIBILITY
Minimum lenth-of-service requirements are usually set for
the purpose of lowering administrative costs through the
elimination of processing "ins and outs" of short-term employees-
Prior to ERISA many plans excluded younger workers, especially
those under thirty, workers with less than five or ten years
of service, and those who were hired late in life (Munnell,
1982).
ERISA changed the eligibility requirements substantially
by requiring that all employees who reach the age of 25 and
have completed 1 year of service be included in the plan.
An exception to this is that when a plan provides full and
immediate vesting, then eligibility may be delayed until an
employee reaches the age of 25 and has completed 3 years of
service. Generally, 1000 hours in a calendar year is considered
a year of service under ERISA. ERISA also prevents employees
from being eliminated from the pension plan for reasons of old
age. An exception to this is that defined benefit plans can
exclude an employee if employment is commenced within 5 years




The age at which employees become eligible to receive a
pension benefit greatly influences the retirement decision for
most workers. For many years the age of 65 has been viewed
as the normal retirement age for receiving full pension benfits
and as such has become the age when society no longer expects
people to work (President's Commission, 1981). Today three out
of four corporate pension plans have a normal retirement benefit
age of 65. Additionally, under ERISA, plans are not permitted
to delay payment of benefits beyond the age of 65 unless the
participant requests such a delay or the employee has partici-
pated in the company's pension plan for less than ten years
(Munnell, 1932).
Early retirement provisions, which usually provide for
retirement before the normal age with reduced benefits from
those payable if retirement were delayed until the later
normal age, may also be included. Many of these early retire-
ment provisions provide for reduced retirement benefits as
early as age 55 (President's Commission, 1981). A 1974- Bureau
of Labor Statistics study of defined benefit plans revealed
that out of 14-67 plans surveyed, ninety-five percent of the
covered workers were in plans that provided provisions for
early retirement benefits. However, only one percent of
these plans paid full normal retirement benefits to early
retirees and the remainder of the cases paid early retirees




Vesting of pension benefits means that at a specified point
in time an employee gains a contractual claim on pension payments.
The rights to benefits are earned and cannot be lost regardless
of whether he leaves his job, is fired or laid off, or leaves
his union (DOL, 1979).
Vesting may be immediate or deferred, and either full or
partial with step increases. Immediate full vesting means
that for each year of participation in a pension plan an employee
is guaranteed a full increment of the retirement benefit. In
contrast, deferred full vesting means that an employee must-
work for a specified number of years before becoming vested
and then the employee becomes entitled to full benefits
retroactive to that individual's first participation in the plan.
Partial vesting (graded vesting) means that an employee becomes
entitled to only a portion of the pension benefit for each year
of participation in the plan. As an example, a plan can provide
for immediate vesting of 10 percent of the benefit after one
year of participation with a 10 percent increase for each
additional year up to 10 years when an employee would be
eligible for 100 percent of the benefit (Greenough and King,
1976).
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974-
requires that private plans must provide for full and immediate
vesting of benefits derived from employee contributions. With
regard to employer contributions, the Act requires that one of




1. Full (100 percent) vesting after 10 years of service.
No vesting is provided for less than 10 years.
2. Graded vesting from 5 to 1 5 years of service. Under
this method an employee gains an unforfeitable right to 25
percent of the pension after 5 years of service, plus 5 percent
for each additional year of service up to 10 years, plus 10
percent for each additional year up to 15 years. This plan
provides for 25 percent of the pension being vested after 5
years, 50 percent after 10 years, and 100 percent after 15
years
.
3. Rule of forty-five based on age and service. This
method provides that if an employee has completed five years
of service and the sum of the employee's age and years of
service add up to forty-five, then the employee is entitled
to 50 percent vesting. For each year of service thereafter
the employee receives an additional 10 oercent vesting uo
to 100 percent. Additionally, each employee with 10 years of
service must be vested for at least 50 percent of the benefit
regardless of age and must receive an additional 10 percent
vesting for each year of service thereafter. (D0L, 1979;
Munnel, 1982; Greenough and King, 1976; Logue, 1979). Of the
three options available, a majority of U.S. corporations have
adopted the first option of providing full vesting after 10




The benefits paid by a private retirement income program
varies widely because of differences in objectives and in
individual work and earnings histories. In discussing retire-
ment benefits a distinction must be made between conventional
plans and pattern plans. A conventional plan is typically a
single employer plan with a contract between the employer and.
nonunionized employees. A pattern plan is usually union-
negotiated. The main difference between these two plans is that
conventional plans use salary history and all years of service
to determine benefit levels while oattern olans pay a flat
J. J. i.
-J
dollar benefit for each year of work (usually up to some
maximum) irrespective of salary history (Logue, 1979).
Conventional plans typically base benefits on a formula
that takes into account the number of years of service, the
historical salary of an employee, and some percentage specified
in the plan. A simple example of such a formula might be:
Annual pension benefit = Salary Basis x Number of years of
service x . 01
5
The salary basis and percentage used may differ greatly from
firm to firm. The salary basis used can range from an average
of the entire career earnings history of an employee to the
final pay of an employee (Logue, 1979).
The trend over the last fifteen years has shown that
final average pay formulas are being used more and more,
increasing from 55 percent in 1960 to 75 percent in 1975.
Of those plans using final average pay formulas as a salary
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basis, 95 percent used the five consecutive years of highest
pay or the five years immediately preceding retirement as the
period for averaging. This trend is not surprising considering
the inflation in the United States over these years. By focusing
on final average pay, firms are providing some protection from
inflation for those employees who are nearing retirement
(Logue, 1979).
Table I shows the approximate annual median pension benefit
as a percentage of final year's compensation under conventional
plans. Salaries ranging from $9,000 to 550,000 are used along
with the assumption of 30 years of service prior to retirement.





















As mentioned earlier, pattern plan benefits are based on
a flat dollar benefit for each year of service regardless of
salary. A 1975 study by the Banker's Trust Company reported
that the median benefit under a pattern plan was $1 08 per year
of service with a range from $66 to $193. This equates to an
annual median pension benefit of $3,2^0 for employees retiring




In 1975, approximately 7 million employees received $ 1 4,31
million in benefits from coverage under private pension plans
for an average of $2,100 per retiree. In 1980 this increased
to 9.1 million employees receiving $35,177 million in benefits
for an average of $3,866 per retiree (Munnell, 1982).
H. ACCOUNTING- EA3I3
Chapter II discussed two methods of financing retirement
income benefits, namely pay-as-you-go (cash basis) and advanced
funding (accrual basis). In dealing with private pension plans,
Federal law regulates the financing of the plans by setting
minimum funding level requirements for the purpose of ensuring
that adequate funds are available to pay future benefits. As
a result, pay-as-you-go basis of accounting is not a viable
alternative to be used with private pension plans (President's
Commission, 1981). Additionally, Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles recognise accrual basis as the accepted method for
accounting for pension costs (Miller, 1982).
Prior to 1974- firms were required to fund their private
pension plans at a minimum level to ensure that benefits
currently earned by participants were covered. To meet this
minimum funding level, annual pension plan contributions equal
to the plan's normal cost plus interest on the unfunded prior
service cost were required. With the enactment of ERISA in
1974- the funding requirements were made more stringent. Under
ERISA, employers are now required to fully fund the normal
cost each year and the prior service cost must be amortized
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over a period not to exceed forty years. The amortization
payments must cover both principle and interest (Munneli, 1982).
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974- requires
that when normal cost and past service cost are used, for
determining contribution levels, the costs must be determined
by using an acceptable actuarial cost method. ERISA recognises
six acceptable actuarial cost methods: the unit credit method;
the entry age normal method; the attained age normal method;
the individual level premium method; the aggregate method; and
the frozen initial liability method (Gibson, 1981). A 1 96 4-
survey of what actuarial methods are actually being used revealed
that of 163 companies responding: 42 percent used the unit
credit actuarial cost method, 37 percent used the entry age
normal method, 7 percent used the attained age normal method,
and the remaining companies used other methods (Ganner and
Kingsberry, 1966). In contrast, the Wyatt Company's 1982
survey of 813 pension plans with 1000 or more active partici-
pants showed the following results: 4-0 percent used the entry
age normal method, 22 percent used the frozen initial liability
method, 20 percent used the unit credit actuarial cost method,
8 percent used the aggregate method and 1 percent used other
methods (Wyatt Company, 1982).
Contributions to a private pension plan fund can either be
made entirely by the employer (non-contributory plans) or
they can be made by both the employer and the employee (contributory
plans). In most plans the employee's portion is refunded, but
not the employer's portion, if employment is terminated prior
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to vesting (Logue, 1979). Today the trend is towards private
pension plans being financed solely by the employer. A 1979
Bureau of Labor Statistics study reported that 77 percent of
all private pension plans are non-contributory (DOL, 1980).
One reason for private plans being non-contributory is that
the tax advantage available from employer contributions to
private pension plans have created a strong incentive for
employers to exclusively finance pension benefits (Munnell,
1979).
I. INSURANCE
A major weakness of early pension plans was that participants
did not hold any legal claim against a firm for payment of
unfunded vested pension payments. Employee claims were against
the pension fund, not the firm. As a result, if a firm went
out of business or terminated its pension plan, the employees
with vested pension claims were only entitled to receive pension
benefits to the extent that the fund had adequate resources.
Recognizing this problem, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974- established a requirement for all firms
to insure their pension funds through either private insurance
or through a newly established federal pension insurance system
called the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
Additionally, under ERISA firms were now held liable for pension
fund deficiencies (Munnell, 1982).
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is a nonprofit
body which is set up within the Department of Labor for the
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purpose of insuring private pension plan participants against
the loss of vested benefits due to termination of the plan.
To finance this termination insurance, an uniform premium of
$2.60 per year for each participant is assessed against the
employer. In the event that a firm terminates its pension
plan without having sufficient assets in its pension fund, the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation will pay participants up
to a maximum of $1,381 per month (Munnell, 1982). To pay for
the cost of these pension claims, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation has the right to attach up to 30 percent of the
firm's net worth. The claim against the firm has the same
status as a tax lien and therefore in the event of bankruptcy,
the pension fund's claim against the firm is senior to the
claims of secured and unsecured debt holders (Logue, 1979).
t»i summ 3.r v the EmDlove*3 Retir^m^nt Ir cons Secur^^v 4 ^t n p
1974- has improved private pension plans in three ways. First,
ERISA's participation and vesting requirements have created
pension guarantees that would not have existed without legis-
lation. Second, funding requirements have led to pension
contributions that otherwise would not have been made. Finally,
up to 30 percent of corporate assets can now be committed to
financing pension benefits under the authority of the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation. As a result of these changes
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.,
private pension plans have been established as serious commitments
whose fulfillment is backed not only by pension fund assets but
also by the assets of the corporation.
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IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION PLANS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter IV provides a discussion of public employee pension
plans. In Section B a brief discussion on the background and
history of public employee pension plans is presented. The
remaining sections discuss the typical characteristics of federal,
state, and local employee pension plans. The characteristics
discussed are: participation eligibility, retirement ages,
vesting, benefits, and accounting basis.
3. HISTORY
The first public employee pension plans date back to 1857
when the New York City police force was provided a pension in
tiie event of disability or a lump-sum payment in the event of
death. This first plan was financed by miscellaneous sources,
such as donations and proceeds from confiscated and unclaimed
property. It was not until twenty-one years later, in 1378,
that non-disability retirement benefits were made a part of the
plan. Under this provision, New York policemen were allowed
to retire without proof of disability at half their final pay
at age 55 with twenty-five years of service. The New York
firemen received a more generous plan at this same time,




During the next half century many other municipal employee
pension plans were brought into existence but only select
groups of employees were covered: namely policemen, firemen
and teachers. Financing for these first plans were either
entirely by the government or entirely by the employees them-
selves (Greenough and King, 1976).
In 1911 Massachusetts established the first retirement
system at the state level which covered the general employees
of the s"cate. Prior to this time, the only public employee
plans were at the municipal level. During the 1920 T s retire-
ment plans for public employees grew in numbers and coverage.
Most of these plans provided separate coverage for special
employee groups such as policemen, firemen, teachers and
general state employees. By 1 94-0 approximately half of all
state and local employees were covered by a retirement system
and by 1 962 an estimated three out of four public employees
had such coverage (Greenough and King, 1976).
In 1976 state and local government retirement systems
covered approximately 10.3 million employees and the propor-
tion of full time state and local employees covered by such
plans was 90 percent. Annual benefits paid in 1976 were
between $6 and $7 billion (Yinklevoss and McGill, 1979).
The Federal Civil Service Retirement System was established
in 1920 with 330,000 civil servants coming under the initial
plan. Participation in the initial plan was limited primarily
to those in the classified civil service, however, in 194-2
coverage was extended to include all officers and employees of
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the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the U.S.
Government and the municipal government of the District of
Columbia. In 194-6 congressmen were allowed to participate in
the plan. By 1969 almost 2.8 million and more than 9 out of
10 federal civilian employees were covered by the civil service
retirement system (Mackin, 1971).
The principle features of today's public employee retire-
ment systems include: disability, death, and survivor benefits;
age, service, and early retirement provisions; vesting provisions,
benefit schedules, and financing arrangements. As in the
discussion on private pension plans, disability, death, and
survivor benefits will not be discussed.
C. PARTICIPATION ELIGIBILITY
Almost all state and local employee pension clans provide
for immediate participation by all full-time employees.
Part-time and temporary employees are not usually eligible to
participate. For those plans that do impose service requirements,
6 or 1 2 months is usually the waiting period that is set.
Participation in the Federal Civil Service Retirement System is
automatic except for members of Congress and certain employees
of the legislative branch who have the option of participating
(Greenough and King, 1976).
D. RETIREMENT AGES
The normal retirement age for public employees is not as
precisely set as is the case for private plan employees.
Public employee pension plans have retirement ages ranging
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from no minimum age to age 65 , with 70 percent having a normal
retirement age under 65. Most plans have a single combination
of age and service requirements to be met prior to retiring
with full benefits (Tilove, 1976). Tilove (1976) states that
the most common combinations used in order of frequency are:
1. Age 60, generally with a minimum of ten years of
service.
2. Age 65, with no minimum service required.
3. Age 55, with in most cases a minimum of twenty-five
years of service but more commonly thirty or more.
J+. Any age, with a minimum of thirty or thirty-five years
of service.
Under the Federal Civil Service Retirement System a number
of combinations of age and service are provided for normal
retirement without reduction of benefits. Full retirement
benefits are payable, at the option of the employee, at age
55 after 30 years of service or at age 60 with 20 years of
service or at age 62 with 5 years of service. Congressmen may
retire at age 60 with 10 years of service or at age 62 after
5 years of service (Greenough and King, 1976).
Most state and local pension plans allow employees to
retire with reduced benefits at a younger age or with less
service than is required for normal retirement. The benefits
for employees retiring early are typically actuarially reduced




Compulsory retirement age provisions are incorporated in
about 79 percent of the state and local pension plans with the
majority setting age 70 as the age for compulsory retirement.
Some states and localities have age 65 set as the age for
compulsory retirement unless the employer specifically allows
a continuation of service. For Civil Service employees retire-




Vesting provisions under state and local employee pension
plans are comparable to ^ncse of private planz. Vesting is
generally full rather than partial, and it most commonly
depends on some specified period of service. Immediate vesting
is rare (lilove, 19 7 6). The most common length of service
requirements for full vesting and their percentages are:
thirty-one percent after 5 years, 13 percent after 10 years,
23 percent after 15 years, and 19 percent at 20 years.
Federal Civil Service employees are vested after 5 years of
plan participation (Greenough and King, 1976).
F. BENEFITS
Public employee retirement plans overwhelmingly use final-
pay plans to determine pension benefits. Final pay plans use
the same three-element formula that is most commonly employed
by private pension plans to compute benefit payments. The
elements of the formula are: a stated percentage times years
of service times final average salary (Tilove, 1976).
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The benefit formulas of most state and local plans use
either the highest three years of average salary (30 percent)
or the highest five years (54- percent). The number of plans
using a career average is negligible (Tilove, 1976). As with
private plans, the trend is towards using final average salaries
so that related pension benefits are provided some degree of
protection against inflation for those employees nearing
retirement. The percentage factor used varies from 1 percent
to 2 percent of final average salary for each year of service
depending upon the system, with the most frequently found
factor to be approximately 1.5 percent of final average salary
for each year of service, or 4.5 percent of final average salary
for 30 years of service (Greenough and King, 1976).
The Federal Civil Service Retirement System uses a three-
element formula for computing retired benefits, however, the
percentage factor is applied in three successive steps according
to years of service. Final average salarv is determined bv the
average salary during the highest three consecutive years.
The benefit formula is applied as follows: 1.5 percent per
year fcr the first 5 years, 1.75 percent for the next five
years, and 2 percent per year for each year thereafter up to
a maximum pension of 80 percent. The reason for the step





As in the case of private pension plans, the method of
financing retirement benefits for public employee pension
plans ranges from pay-as-you-go (cash basis) to advanced funding
(accrual basis). Since public pension plans do not come under
the jurisdiction of ERISA, they are not required by law to
fund their pension plans. As a result, public pension plans
must deal with the issue of whether to fund or not fund their
pensions and, if funding is elected, to what extent (Munnell,
1979).
Proponents for pay-as-you-go financing argue that reserves
for paying pension benefits are not needed since public authori-
ties are bound to fulfill benefit commitments and federal,
state and local governments nave the power to tax and "therefore
will be able to raise the needed money. A second argument
presented is that reserves would merely serve as an invitation
to enact benefit increases without an increase in contributions,
i.e., in the future it might be argued that reserves are not
needed or at least they are too large, and authorities may be
persuaded to give higher benefits without higher contributions.
A final argument for pay-as-you-go financing is that the
relatively "soft dollars" of the future will make it easier
to contribute. A "soft dollar" is the depreciated value of
the dollar over time (Tilove, 1976).
Advocates of funding feel that the single most important
consideration in favor of funding is that it helps enforce
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responsibility. Funding prevents those in authority from
adopting lavish benefit provisions for today's workers, "while
passing the cost on to future generations. Another argument
in favor of funding is that investment earnings on pension
funds will reduce future contribution requirements. On the
average, earnings from investments make-up 26 percent of the
total receipts of state and local retirement systems. As a
result, funding can mean a smaller total outlay of public
funds for pension benefits (Tilove, 1976). Munnell (1979)
makes the following points for the desirability of funding
at the state and local level:
1. To enforce fiscal responsibility through explicit
recognition of the long-term costs of proposed benefit changes.
2. To ensure that adequate revenues are available to
fulfill future oension obligations.
3. To allocate pension costs as benefits accrue so that
they are financed by the generation that enjoys the services
of public employees.
4.. To strengthen the position of state-local governments
in financial markets to avoid excessive interest costs or low
credit ratings due to large unfunded liabilities.
The present trend in financing of public pension plans is
towards some level of funding. A 1978 pension task force
report on public employee retirement systems indicated that
only 17 percent of state and local pension plans and 35 percent
of federal pension plans use pay-as-you-go as a basis for
financing benefits. The remaining plans use some method of
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funding to accumulate reserves to pay for benefits in the
future (Munnell, 1979). The level of funding can be either
partial or full. Munnell (1979) maintains that public pension
plans have less of a need for full funding of benefits than
private plans due to the fact that public plans are supported
by governments which have perpetual life and the power to
tax. Today's funding of public pension funds bear out Munnell'
s
feeling with the typical federal, state, or local pension plan
employing partial funding vice full funding.
At first glance public pensions appear to be considerably
more generous than private pension plans considering the
differences in benefit formulas, salary averaging periods, and
retirement ages. However, when employee contributions are
taken into consideration, this difference narrows substantially.
As an example, a 1971 New York State Department of Labor survey
revealed that a New York state or local government employee with
30 years of service and final salary of $10,000 received 4-9
percent of the final salary under New York's public pension
plan as compared to 24. percent for a worker under a private
pension plan. However, once the public employee's contribution
is considered, the net rate for the public employee drops to
34- percent. Additionally, for workers with shorter periods of
service the difference is even smaller. For a worker with 20
years of service and a final salary of $10,000, the net rate
for the public employee is 23 percent of final salary as opposed




Ninety percent of the state and local plans are contributory
as opposed to only 33 percent of the private plans. Virtually
all federal civilian employee pension plans have an employee
contribution provision. State and local plans normally require
employee contributions of 5 to 7 percent of wages while the
civil service system receives employee contributions of 7 percent
of wages. In 1 9 75, approximately 35 percent of contributions
to state and local plans were financed by the employee and 16
percent of the federal contributions were made by the employee.
In contrast, less than 3 percent of the contributions to private





As discussed in Chapter I, the objective of this thesis
is to determine an appropriate method for accounting for the
cost of retired benefits so that the full cost of a manpower
decision can be identified in the period in which decisions
are made regarding the utilization of that manpower. As seen
in Chapter II, the current generally accepted procedures for
accounting- for retirement costs is through the use of accrual
basis accounting along with actuarial cost methods. Actuarial
cost methods are used to determine the normal cost and past
service cost needed to fund pension plans. The funding of the
military retirement system is not within the scope of this
thesis, therefore the mechanics of funding a retirement plan
will not be discussed. Appendix I contains a summary of the
work done by the Defense Manpower Data Center showing a method
for fully funding the military retirement system.
Actuarial cost methods were designed primarily as funding
techniques, however, the methods may also be used for determining
pension costs for accrual basis accounting (Hicks, 1965). It
is this second use, the determination of pension costs under
accrual basis accounting, that will be considered in this
chapter. A decision on funding the military retirement system
has no bearing on the importance of using accrual basis accounting
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for the military retirement system. Accrual basis accounting is
the recognized method for matching expenses with the period in
which they are incurred (Welsch and Anthony, 1981). Accrual
basis accounting allocates costs to the period of employment,
not the period of retirement. Therefore, accrual basis
accounting is the approach that will be used along with actuarial
cost methods to assign the cost of future retirement benefits
to the period in which they are earned (Tilove, 1976).
In discussing actuarial cost methods to be used in determining
yearly retirement costs, past service costs will not be considered,
As previously defined, past service cost is the pension cost
assigned to years prior to the inception of a pension plan.
Past service cost plays an important role in the overall
funding scheme of a pension plan but it has no effect on the
current year f s accrued cost for benefits earned. On the other
hand, normal cost is the annual cost assigned under actuarial
cost methods to years subsequent to the inception of a pension
plan. It is this cost that is recognized as the yearly cost
of future pension benefits (Hicks, 1965).
Along with the normal cost, actuarial gains and losses must
also be considered in determining the correct portion of the
cost of future benefits to be assigned to the current year.
Actuarial gains and losses are the variances between the
actuarial assumptions used in calculating retirement costs and
the actual results of experience. The gains and losses can
be applied on the immediate basis (assigned entirely to the
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current year) or the spread basis (ammortized over a number of
future years) (Phoenix and Bosse, October 1967).
In deciding which actuarial method should be employed,
generally accepted accounting principles provide that any of
the actuarial cost methods discussed in Chapter II are appro-
priate as long as costs are allocated in a rational and system-
atic manner (Hicks, 196.5). In determining which actuarial
cost method is most appropriate for use in allocating the cost





The individual level premium method and the aggregate
method are not considered to be appropriate alternatives for
determining accrued military retirement costs. Both of these
methods combine the past service cost with the normal cost in
arriving- at the cost to be applied to a given year. As discussed
earlier, only the normal cost and actuarial gains and losses
are to be recognized in determining the current year's portion
of the cost of future retirement benefits.
2. The unit credit cost method is not commonly used by
public employee retirement systems. One reason is that the
method is not readily applicable to plans which base benefits
on final salary. The unit credit cost method calculates the
amount needed to purchase a unit of retirement benefit based
on a percentage of the current year's salary. Since the
military's retirement benefit is based on the final month's
basic pay (average of the highest 36 months of basic pay for
members entering the service after September 8, 1980), the
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method is not suited for determining the accrued cost of military
retirement benefits. A second reason is that the present value
of each year's unit of cost is used as the normal cost charged
to that year. Under this method, the normal cost becomes larger
each year because the closer an employee gets to retirement the
shorter the period becomes for providing for the present value
of the future retirement benefits. As a result cost increases
with age and does not necessarily reflect the period's true
accrued protion of the benefit cost (Smith, 1977).
3. The entry age normal method is the most widely used
actuarial method by both public and private pension plans.
The attractiveness of the entry age normal method is that it
develops a level annual amount or percentage of pay to be
spread over the employee's total years of active service.
Each year of service shares equally in accounting for the
normal cost of an individual's future retirement benefits.
Additionally, a level percentage of payroll is preferable
because it provides a fair spread of cost between generations
and between present and future price and income levels. (Tilove,
1976; Wyatt Company, 1933) Frankel and Eutler (1982) have
incorporated this method in the calculation of retirement costs
for the enlisted billet cost model. Finally, Smith (1977)
maintains that selection of the appropriate actuarial cost
method and the implementation of that method is the proper
function of the actuary because only the actuary has the
expertise and professional judgement necessary to make the
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decision. If one agrees with Smith's position then the entry
age normal method, which is utilized by the Defense Manpower
Data Center fDMDC) actuary in the valuation of the military
retirement system, should be considered as an appropriate
method for allocating military retired costs.
The entry age normal method can be applied on the individual
basis or the aggregate basis. Both of these methods will be
explored to see how each is applied in allocating the yearly
cost of future retirement benefits. In applying the entry
age normal method actuarial gains and losses must be considered
as a part of each year's retirement cost. Gains and losses
occur due to differences in what actually transpired and what
had been assumed to take place through the use of actuarial
assumptions. Actuarial gains and losses are, at best, an
indication of the short term accuracy of the actuarial assumptions
used. Since retirement costs are viewed as long-range costs,
Hicks (1965) in APB No. 8 maintains that actuarial gains and
losses should be spread over a reasonable period of years,
either through the normal application of the actuarial method
or by separate adjustments (Phoenix and Bosse, October 1967).
The most common method used in spreading is to spread all
unamortized gains and losses over the future service lives
(or payroll) of the active plan participants. In application,
the adjustments are usually included in the calculation of the
current year's normal cost. This method has the advantage of
spreading the gains and losses over an annually revised period
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approximately equal to the future service-life of the active
members instead of amortizing the gains and losses over some
fixed period. (Dreher, 1967; Tilove, 1976).
Of the two techniques used for employing the entry age
normal method, the individual basis and aggregate basis, the
former will be discussed first.
B. INDIVIDUAL BASIS
The individual basis, as the word implies, is used for
calculating the retirement cost for an individual participant
of a plan. In calculating the current year's cost of an
individual's retirement benefit, both normal cost and actuarial
gains and losses are recognized. Under the entry age normal
method, the normal cost is the level annual amount for each
employee which, if accumulated over each member's entire service-
life, would provide for the employee's full pension at retirement
Actuarial gains and losses on the other hand, are the difference
between the normal cost under actual conditions and normal cost
under assumed conditions. The gains and losses are spread over
the remaining service-life of the individual resulting in only
a portion of the gains/losses being charged to the current
year. The sum of the normal cost and the current year's
portion of the gains/losses equals the current year's accrued
retirement cost for an individual service member.
In applying the individual basis to the active force as a
whole, known historical averages combined with projections
for the future can be used to determine the current year's
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accrued retirement cost for each entrant group. This technique
is illustrated in Section D of this chapter.
An entry age normal method, individual basis, can be used
for either an individual, or an entrant group as a whole, in
calculating the current year's accrued retirement cost for a
retiree(s) expected to retire in a given pay grade. The accrued
retirement cost for an individual is determined first, steps
1-3 below, and then the cost for the entrant group is derived
in step A. The methodology used for the individual basis is
as follows
:
1. Individual normal cost computation.
a. Calculate the annual retired annuity, A(G,L0S),
for an individual retiring in pay grade, G, and length
of service, LOS. The current military retired pay
formula is used.
A(G,L0S) = min (2.5$ x LOS, 75$) x BP x 12
where: LOS = length of service at retirement
G = pay grade of retiree
BP = final monthly basic pay (ave. of the
highest 36 months of basic pay if entered
after September 8, 1980)
b. Calculate the present value of the future retirement
benefits, P, as of the date of retirement.
1





where: A(G,LOS) = annual retired annuity
i = annual discount rate
L = life expectancy of individual at
date of retirement
Calculate the normal cost, NC, which is the level
annual cost associated with providing for the
future retirement benefits.
c.
NC = P (1 + i) n - 1
where: P = present value of future retirement
benefits
annua. Lis count rate
n number of years that normal cost
contributions are made
2. Individual actuarial gains and losses computation.
a. Calculate the actuarial gains/losses, F, by taking
the difference between the normal cost under current
conditions, NC, and the normal cost under actuarial
assumptions, AC. The normal cost under actuarial
assumptions, AC, is determined in the same manner as
the normal cost under current conditions, NC, except
that the previous year's actuarial assumed conditions
are used instead of the current actual conditions in
calculating the present value of future retirement
benefits, P, and the normal cost under actuarial




in use for more than one year. Actuarial gains and
losses are not a factor in the initial year of
implementation)
.
F = NC - AC
where: NC = normal cost under current conditions.
AC = normal cost under actuarial assumptions
Current year's total individual retirement cost computation
a. Calculate the current year's portion of the gains/
losses applied, Fa. Under the individual basis gains
and losses are spread over the remaining expected
work-life of the individual.
Fa = (F + Fd)
(1 + i) rw:
where: F = current year's gains/ losses
Fd = prior year's deferred gains/losses
RWL = remaining work-life of an individual
i = annual discount rate
b. Calculate the current year's total retirement cost,
RC, for an individual expected to retire in grade, G,
and length of service, LOS.
RC = NC + Fa
where: NC = normal cost under current conditions
Fa = gains/losses applied to current year
4.. Total current year's retirement cost computation for all
individuals in an entrant group who are expected to retire in
pay grade, G, and length of service, LOS.
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a. Calculate the number of people, N, from a given
entrant group who are expected to retire in pay grade, G.
N = I x Pr(R) x Pr(G)
where: I = number of entrants for a given year
Pr(R) = probability of entrant reaching retirement,
R
Pr(G) = probability of entrant retiring in given
pay grade, G
b. Calculate the current year's total retirement cost,
TRC , for all individuals in an entrant group who are
expected to retire in pay grade, G, and length of
service, 108.
TRC = RC x N
where: RC = tctal retirement cost for an individual
N = number of people expected to retire in
pay grade, G
D. INDIVIDUAL BASIS EXAMPLE
The following example demonstrates the use of the methodology
discussed in Section C, Hypothetical data (an approximation
of 1932 actual data) is used to compute the 1982 retirement cost
for members who entered the military in 1964. and are expected
to retire in pay grade E-7, after 22.2 years of service (DOD,
April 1932).
1. Participant data and actuarial assumptions.
Year of service entry 1964.
Grade at retirement E-7
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,0S at retirement 22.2 (ave. LOS




Life expectancy assumption 32.95
Discount rate 10.0$
Annual salary scale increase 7.5$
1982 E-7 basic pay @ 22 YOS $1,522.20
Projected 1986 E-7 basic pay $2,032.85
Deferred gains and losses ($4-. 75)
Normal cost under assumed conditions $1,631.10
(calculated using previous year's assumed conditions)
Probability of new entrant retiring .11
Proportion of entrants retiring as E-7's .^33
Number of new entrants in 1964- 230,000
2. 1982 individual normal cost computation.
a. Calculate the annual retired annuity, A(G,L0S),
for an E-7 expected to retire in 1986 with 22.2 years
of service.
A (E-7, 22.2) = 2.5:^ x 22.2 x $2,032.35 x 12
= $13,538.79
b. Calculate the 1986 present value of the future




P = $13,538.79 x 1 1 + .1 ;2.95
.1




c. Calculate the 1982 individual normal cost, NC.
1
(1 + .1 )
22.
J
NC = $129,530.67 x
= 129,530.67 x .0137
= $1775.
U
1982 actuarial gains and losses computation,
a. Calculate the 1982 individual actuarial gains/
losses, F
.
F = $1 775.1 4 - 1 ,631 .10
= $144-04
1982 total individual retirement cost computation.
a. Calculate the gains/losses applied, Fa, in 1982
Fa = {1U.04. + (4.75)}
(1 + . 1 )
= $139.29 x .263 8
= $36.74
b. Calculate the 1982 total individual retirement
cost, RC, for a 1964 entrant expected to retire as an
E-7 in 1986.
RC = $1 ,775.1 4 + 36.74
= $1 ,811 .38
5. 1982 total retirement cost computation, TRC, for all
1964 entrants expected to retire as S-7's in 1986.
a. Calculate the number of 1964 entrants expected
to retire as S-7's, N.




b. Calculate the 1982 total retirement cost, TRC, for
all 1964- entrants expected "go retire as E-7's in 1986.
TRC = 10,955 x $1 ,811 .88
= $19, 849, U5. 40
S. CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS
This section contains a discussion on how changes in the
various actuarial assumptions results in the individual's
total retirement cost being higher or lower than normal cost.
Table II illustrates the effect that actuarial gains and losses
have on the total cost for an individual S-7 retiree described
in Section D for years 1964.-198,1. The gains and losses occur
as a result of variances between the assumed annual pay scale
increase (7.5 percent) and the actual annual increase experienced
Additional gains/losses would normally be expected to occur as
a result of variances in the other actuarial assumptions not
included in this example. Relatively large gains were recognized
in years 1966, 1970, 1973, 1981, and 1982. As can be seen from
the table, each of these years' percentage of basic pay increase
was well above the assumed 7.5 percent increase. In the majority
of the remaining years, losses occurred due to basic pay
increasing at a slower pace than the assumed rate.
If the actuarial assumptions used ara reasonably close
approximations of what actually takes place in the long run,
then the short term gains/losses tend to cancel each other out
in the long run. In this illustration, the gains tend to





% B? Gains/ Year '
s
Year Pay Losses Applied Deferred Cost
1964 M.3% $ $ - $ $1 , 71 4
1965 2.3 (79) (9) (78) 1 , 626
1966 10.4 53 (3) (17) 1 ( 685
1967 3.2 (67) (10) (81) 1
'
611
1968 5.6 (28) (13) (97) 1 , 580
1969 6.9 (9) (13) (96) -1 ,571
1970 12.6 75 (3) (10) 1 ,656
1971 8.1 9 1 668
1972 7.9 6 1 6 1 ,675
1973 -1 * i 07 -1 c> 1 ng 1 7 q ry
1974 6. 2 (22) 12 72 -1i
1975 5.5 (32) 6 31 1 ,733
1976 5.0 (40) (1) (12) 1 686
1977 3.6 (61) (12) (67) 1 61 4
1973 6.2 (20) (15) (74) 1 592
1979 5.5 (30) (19) (37) 1 55 7
1930 7.0 (7) (19) (76) -1! ,550
1981 11.7 61 (3) (5)
-1
1 j 62 8
1982 1 4 . q 144 37 1 1 7 1 ,812
1983 4.0 (58) 19 '35 1 ,736
1984 if * -J (56) (9) (18) 1 ,653
1985 7.5 (11) (8) 1 ,651
1986 7.5 (9) 1 ,653
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the gains and losses for the period 1964-1984. was a net loss
of ($53). This less is the amount by which the overall retire-
ment cost is reduced due to the long run effect of annual
salary increasing at a slower rate than had been planned for
under the actuarial assumptions. The actual average annual
salary scale increase for this same period was approximately 7
percent.
Table III shows what the approximate effect one or another
change in actuarial assumptions will have on individual and
entrant group normal cost. Computations are based on 301,000
enlisted entrants with 1981 service entry dates. The remainder
of the participant data and actuarial assumptions are as stated
in Section D of this chapter. The effect that each actuarial
assumption has en normal cost is discussed:
1 , mriange in interest rat 8n vt (^ V* Q o C* p in the an n u a
.
interest rate from 9s percent to 1 percent would reduce the
entrant group annual normal cost by $9.3 million, or 10.3
percent. Overall, for each j percent increase in the interest
rate, normal cost is reduced by approximately 5.2 percent.
2. Change in salary scale. A change in the rate at which
the salary scale increases or decreases also effects normal
cost. A change in the annual salary scale from 7t percent
to 8 percent results in the annual entrant group normal cost
increasing by $8.8 million, or 11 percent. Each t percent
increase in the rate that the annual salary changes results




Changes in Actuarial Assumptions
Interest Individual Entrant Group percent
rate normal cost normal cost change
($ millions)
9.50$ $6,307 $90.4
10.00 5,659 81.1 10.31
10.25 5,362 76.9 5.2
Salary Individual Entrant Group Percent
scale normal cost normal cost change
($ millions)
7. 253 $5,374 $77.0
7.50 5,659 81.1 5.33
8.00 b,273 90.0 11.0
Percent Individual Entrant group Percent
retiring normal cost normal cost change
($ millions)
10.^53 &5,659 £79.3
11.00 5,659 81.1 2.32
11.50 5,659 84.3 4.6
Percent
retiring Individual Entrant group





Life Individual Entrant group
expectancy normal cost normal cost change
($ millions)
32.50 vrs $5,647 $81 .0
33.00 5,660 81.1 0.13
34.00 5,683 31.5 0.5
Individual Entrant group Percent
LOS normal cost normal cost change
($ millions)
21 yrs $5,243 $75.2
22 5,648 81.0 7.73
23 5,698 81.7 0.9
Number Individual Entrant group Percent
entrants normal cost normal cost change
($ millions)
295,000 $5,659 $79.5
300,000 5,659 80.9 1.83








3. Changes in the percent retiring from an entrant group
and the percent retiring as S~7's from an entrant group. The
effect of changes in these two percentages are not as signi-
ficant as the previous two discussed. An increase from 11
percent to 11$ percent for the percent retiring from an entrant
group and from 4-3t percent to kL percent for the percent of those
retiring as E-7's, results in an increase in normal cost by
$3.7 million, or 4»6 percent, and $.9 million, or 1.1 percent
respectively. For each \ percent increase in the percent
retiring from an entrant group normal cost increases by approxi-
mately 2.3 percent. For a % percent increase in the percent
retiring as 1-7' s the normal cost increases by about 0.6
percent.
4.. Changes in retired life expectations. The effect of
a change in retired life expectations does not have the same
degree of impact on normal cost as interest rate and salary
scale changes. A one year (3 percent) increase from 33 to 34-
years in the length of time that a retiree is expected to
live after retirement results in an increase in normal cost
of only $.4. million, or 0.5 percent.
5. Changes in the number of entrants. A change in the
number of entrants has the effect of changing the normal cost
in direct proportion with the change in the number of people
entering the service. As can be seen from Table III, an increase
in the number of entrants from 300,000 to 310,000 (3 1/3 percent)
increases the normal cost by $2.7 million, or 3 1/3 percent.
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6. Change in length of service at retirement. The effect
that a change in the length of service has on the annual normal
cost is dependent upon whether or not the change includes an
increase in final monthly basic pay due to a longevity step
increase in salary, i.e., at LOS 20, 22, and 26. As an example,
a one year increase in LOS from 21 to 22 years, which includes
a longevity step increase in basic pay, result in normal cost
increasing by $5.8 million, or 7.7 percent. In contrast, a one
year increase from 22 to 23 years of service without a longevity
step increase results in a normal cost increase of only $.7
million, or 0.9 percent.
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the actuarial
assumptions used for determining the annual normal cost can
have a great impact on the retirement cost charged to the
current year. For this reason it is important, that actuarial
assumptions be evaluated on a continuing basis to ensure
that they accurately reflect the real situation. A survey by
Ganner and Kingbery ( 1 966) revealed that 89 percent of 163
plans studied recomputed actuarial assumptions every year.
Of the actuarial assumptions previously discussed, only
the interest rate and life expectancy assumptions are completely
independent and uncontrollable by the decision maker. mvn«
remaining assumptions, salary scale changes, percent retiring,
percent retiring in a given grade, length of service at retirement,
and number of entrants are factors that can be effected by changes
made by the decision maker.
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In the previous discussion on changes in actuarial assumptions,
various factors were changed and the resultant impact discussed.
However, in each case it was assumed that only one of the
factors was effected by the change and therefore the results
could be easily predicted. In reality, a change in one factor
normally will effect the other factors in a manner which may
either counteract the intended results of the change or compound
them. As an example, an increase in the salary scale may also
result in more people staying until retirement age and retiring
with a longer length of service. However as the average length
of service increases retirement age also increases and given the
same life expectancy, the number of years of retirement is
shortened. The shortened number of retirement years would help
to counteract the effect of the other increases.
TABLE IV




Chg. Salary % at Life normal percent
no
.
scale Stay retire expect cost increase
7.5% ^Mo 22.2 32.95 $81 .1
1 8.0 1
1
22.2 32.95 89.9 10.9$
2 8.0 12 22.2 32.95 98.1 17.3
3 8.0 12 23.0 32.95 99.2 18.2
k 8.0 12 23.0 32.04 98.7 17.8
Table IV illustrates a hypothetical case in which an
increase in salary scale (change no. 1) is accompanied by a
change in the percent staying until retirement (change no. 2),
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the length of service at retirement (change no. 3) and the life
expectations after retirement (change no. 4-). An initial *
percent change in salary scale results in normal cost increasing
by about 11 percent however, the cumulative effect of changes
in salary scale, percent staying until retirement, length of
service at retirement and life expectancy after retirement
results in an overall increase in normal cost of about 13 percent
As can be seen from this example, to be a useful tool, the
decision maker in predicting the change in the retirement cost
must consider the total effect a change has on all of the
actuarial assumptions. Without this consideration, the results
may be significantly different than initially expected.
As discussed in Section G and illustrated in the example
in Section D, the retirement cost for an individual entrant can
be calculated through the use of an entry age normal method.
In practice,, however, the user must be cautious when considering
the effects that an individual entrant's retirement cost has
on the entrant group as a whole. For instance, to assume that
a decrease in the active force by 1000 people would result in a
decrease in the retirement cost by the cost, of 1000 retirees
is erroneous since a portion of the 1000 people would not
normally be expected to stay until reaching retirement age
even if the force was not reduced. As an example, if the assumed
percentage of entrants staying until retirement is ^^%, then
the retirement cost is only reduced by the cost of 110 {^^% x
1000) entrants who are expected to stay until retirement.
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The other 890 entrants are expected to leave the service before
reaching retirement and therefore can not be considered as
part of a cost reduction.
F. AGGREGATE BASIS
The normal cost under the individual basis entry age normal
method is computed as a level amount for each participant of
the plan. However, when the entry age normal method is applied
on the aggregate basis, separate amounts are not computed for
individual members. Instead, computation of the costs are
based on the total plan with a level percentage of payroll
being used to allocate retired costs to the current year
(Hicks, 1965).
The level percentage factor to be used in comouting the
normal cost is derived by dividing the present value of the
expected future retirement benefits for the new entrant group
by the present value of future salaries of a new entrant group
starting their career on the valuation date. The level
percentage factor determined from the entrant group data is
then applied to the current year's tctal basic pay of the
active force in calculating the year's total normal cost.
The present value of future retirement benefits and the present
value of future salaries have been computed by The Office of
the Actuary, Defense Manpower Data Center. The resultant
normal cost for officers and enlisted as a percentage of
payroll was 4-6.2 percent in 1980, 47 percent in 1981 and 50.7
percent in 1982. Officers had a normal cost percentage of
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38 percent of basic pay in 1980, j+0 percent of basic pay in
1981, and L2 percent of basic pay in 1982. (DOD, 1980; DOB,
1981; DOD, September 1982)
The Defense Manpower Data Center in its valuation of the
military retirement system uses the entry age normal method on
the aggregate basis. In valuating the military retirement
system, DMDC assumes that a funding scheme would be established
and therefore past service cost is recognized along with normal
cost and actuarial gains and losses with the gains/losses being
added to the past service cost and amortized over a period of
4.0 years (See Appendix I for a -:-umraar; )f DMDC's computations).
The method employed by DMDC can be adapted for use in determining
the current year's cost of future retirement benefits without
recognizing the past service cost by implementing the frozen
initial liability method. rJnder this method, the past service
cost at implementation of the plan remains constant throughout
the life of the plan and therefore is not considered in calcu-
lating the current year's cost of future retirement benefits
(Kicks, 1965).
In calculating the current year's accrued cost of the
active force's retirement benefit, as was the case for the
individual method, both normal cost and actuarial gains and
losses are considered. Past service liability is not a factor.
However, the normal cost is determined by applying the normal
cost percentage factor to the current year's total basic pay
of the active force. Actuarial gains/losses for the aggregate

basis are calculated in a similar manner as they were for the
individual basis except that the computations are in the aggregate,
i.e., the difference is taken between the aggregate normal cost
under actual conditions and the aggregate normal cost under
assumed conditions. Amortization of gains/losses that are
accumulated under the aggregate basis are handled in basically
the same manner as under the individual basis and as illustrated
in Table II. The difference between amortization under the
aggregate basis and amortization under the individual basis is
the period over which the gains/losses are spread. For the
a g g re gate bazie gains '] 'sses are spree 1 :ver a reasonable period
of time, normally 10-20 years , instead of the remaining work-
life of the active force (Phoenix and Bosse, August 1967).
The reason for this difference is that when dealing with the
active force as a whole the assumption is made that the force
has a perpetual work-life. In contrast, the work-life of an
entrant under the individual basis can be measured. Therefore,
a reasonable period of time is arbitrarily selected, 20 years
in this case, for spreading the gains/losses of the active work
force. The sum of the normal cost and the gains/losses applied
to the current year is the current year's accrued cost of the
active force's total future retirement benefit.
G. AGGREGATE BASIS METHOD
The method for using the entry age normal method on the
aggregate basis is as follows:
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1. Normal cost .computation.
a. Calculate the normal cost percentage factor, PF.
? F = ? B e
pel
where: PBe = present value of future benefits of new
entrant group
PCe = present value of future compensation of
new entrant group
b. Calculate the normal cost for the current year's
active force.
NC = PF x TBP
where: PF = normal cost percentage factor
TBP = total basic pay for current year
2. Actuarial gains and losses computations.
a. Calculate the actuarial gains/losses, F, by taking
the difference between the normal cost under current
conditions, NC, and the normal cost under actuarial
assumptions, AC. (This presumes that the plan has been
in use for more than one year. Actuarial gains and
losses are not a factor in the initial year of
implementation)
.
F = NC - AC
where: NC = normal cost under current conditions
AC = normal cost under actuarial assumptions
3. Current year total retirement cost computation.
a. Calculate the current year's portion of gains/iosse;
applied, Fa. Under the aggregate basis gains and
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Fa - (F + Fd)
L
1 - :o(TTTr 1
where: F = current year's gains/losses
Fd = prior year's deferred gains/losses
i = annual discount rate
b. Calculate the current year's total retirement cost
for the active force.
TRC = NC + Fa
where: NC = normal cost for the current year
Fa = gains/losses applied to current year
K. AGGREGATE BASIS EXAMPLE
The following example demonstrates the use of the aggregate
basis methodology discussed in Section G. Hypothetical data
(an approximation of 1 982 actual data used by the Defense
Manpower Data Center) is used to compute the total 1982 accrued
retirement cost. The normal cost under assumed conditions is
arbitrarily selected for purposes of demonstration of the
aggregate method. This cost would normally be determined
by using the actuarial assumptions of the previous year for
computation of the cost.
1. Participant data and actuarial assumptions.
Dollars in Billions
Year of computation 1 982





Present value of future benefits of new
entrant group
Present value of future compensation of
new entrant group
Normal cost under assumed conditions
Deferred gains and losses






a. Calculate the normal cost percentage factor, PF.
n-n _ ^ 4 > --
r£ 35.3
= 50.6$
b. Calculate the 1982 normal cost, NC, for the active
force.
NC = $0. 6% x $27.9
= $ 1 4. • 1
3. 1982 actuarial gains and losses
a. Calculate the 1982 actuarial gains/losses, F.
F = $U.1 - 13.0
= $1.1
4.. 1982 total retirement cost computation.
a. Calculate the gains/losses applied, Fa, in 1982.
Fa =(1.1+ 3.2)








b. Calculate the 1932 total retirement cost, TRC, for
the active force.
TRC = $14.1 + .5
= $U.6
I. CHANGES IN AGGREGATE ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS
Changes in one or more of the actuarial assumptions used
in calculating tne annual normal cost of the active military
force on the aggregate basis have the same effect that the
changes had on normal cost computations under the individual
basis. Under the aggregate basis changes in the actuarial
assumptions are reflected in either the total basic pay factor
or the normal cost percentage factor. Changes in salary scale
and size of the active force directly effect the total basic
pay factor. Changes in each of the remaining actuarial
assumptions -- interest rate, percent staying until retirement,
percent retiring in a given pay grade, retired life expectations,
and length of service -- have an effect on the normal cost
percentage factor.
Table V has been prepared to show what the approximate
effect that changes in total basic pay or normal cost percentage
factor have on the current year's accrued retirement cost. As
was the case for changes in the number of entrants under the
individual basis, the normal cost under the aggregate basis
changes in direct proportion with the change in total basic
pay. For a 1 percent increase in total basic pay from $27.9
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Changes in the percentage factor have a greater impact on normal
cost than basic pay changes. An increase in the normal cost
percentage factor from 51.2 percent to 52.2 percent results in
the normal cost increasing by 2.0 percent. For each § percent
increase in the percentage factor normal cost increases by
approximately 1.0 percent.
Along with understanding how changes in total pay and the
normal cost percentage factor effect the normal cost, it is
important for the decision maker to understand how changes in
the actuarial assumptions, which the decision maker has some
control over, effect the total Day factor s. nd the normal cost
percentage factor. A brief discussion of each element follows:
1. Changes in salary scale. An increase in the rate at
which annual basic pay increases has a direct effect on the
total basic pay factor used in the normal cost calculation.
For each percent that the salary scale increases, total basic
pay also increases by that same percentage.
2. Change in the percent retiring. An increase in the
percentage of people staying until retirement has the effect
of increasing the normal cost percentage factor and in turn the
annual accrued cost of the retirement benefits also increases.
The normal cost percentage factor increases due to the fact that
the present value of future benefits becomes larger due to
more people receiving retired pay. The present value of future
salaries also increases because basic pay is received for a
longer period of time but the increase is usually not as great
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as the benefits increase. Changes in the percent of people
retiring in a given grade are effected in a similar manner.
3. Changes in the number of entrants. An increase in the
number of entrants has a direct effect on the annual accrued
cost of future retirement benefits. The total basic pay factor
increases due to the larger number of recipients and the normal
cost percentage factor does not change because the present value
of future benefits and the present value of future salaries
increase proportionately. As a result, the annual accrued cost
of retirement benefits will increase.
Z.. Change in the length of service at retirement. With
an increase in the length of time that a person serves before
retiring, both total basic pay factor and the normal cost
percentage factor will increase. With both factors increasing
the resultant effect is that the accrued retirement cost will
also increase. The increase in the total basic pay factor is
caused by members receiving basic pay for a longer period of
time. The increase in the normal percentage factor is caused
by the present value of future benefits increasing more than
the present value of future salaries. Increases in both
benefits and salaries are a result of the longer length of
service
.
When considering what effect a change in an actuarial
assumption might have on the annual cost of retirement benefits,
the decision maker must look at the total impact that the
change may have on all of the actuarial assumptions. As discussed
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under the individual basis, a simple increase in salary scale
may change the other assumptions discussed, i.e., percent
retiring, number of entrants, length of service at retirement,
and life expectations at retirement. For this reason it is
extremely important that actuarial assumptions be continually
evaluated and adjusted so that accurate cost estimations can
be determined for accruing a portion of the cost of future
retirement benefits to the current year.
J. AGGREGATE BASIS OR INDIVIDUAL BASIS
The aggregate basis and the individual basis "when applied
to an entry age normal actuarial method are generally the same.
Both basis are used to determine the normal cost which is the
level amount, which if paid annually over the entire period of
recognized service, would provide at retirement the full
retirement benefits. The basic difference between the two
methods is that under the individual basis calculations of
normal cost are made for individuals and under the aggregate
basis, separate calculations of normal cost are not determined
for individuals (Hicks, 1965).
In accessing which of the two basis is preferable, the
intended use of the data must be considered. The aggregate
basis lends itself to applications in which total force retire-
ment costs are desired. The reason that this basis is useful
for determining total force retirement costs is because it
uses the cumulative data of the whole force instead of individual
data in calculating the normal cost. By applying the normal
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cost percentage factor to the total annual basic pay of the
active force, total current year retirement costs can be
determined. Areas for which the aggregate basis can be used
are in budget forecasting and the actual accounting for the
current year's accrued portion of the cost of the future
retirement benefits of the active force. Each of these areas
are concerned with the retirement cost of the total active force
and therefore cumulative data instead of individual data can
be used.
The individual basis can be used for calculating the accrued
cost of retirement benefits for the active force as a whole,
but it is more applicable to individual or entrant group
calculations. This basis could be used by the decision maker
who is concerned with altering a particular segment of the
active force rather than the force as a whole. An example of
this would be increasing the number of active members from a
particular year group who will stay until retirement by providing
incentive pays and bonuses. The effect of this change on
retired costs could be determined by treating the year group as
an "individual" and applying the changed actuarial assumptions
to the year group as a whole in calculating the new normal
cost and actuarial gains/losses. However, the decision maker
must be careful to ensure that any effect that the change might
have on other members of the active force are included in the
new retirement cost computations.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides a discussion on zhe conclusions and
recommendations of this study. The purpose of the study was
to evaluate alternative methods for accounting for the cost
of military retirement benefits.
The present method for accounting for the cost of military
retirement benefits is the pay-as-you-go basis. The problem
with the pay-as-you-go basis is that it puts off recognising
the cost of the retirement benefits of the current active force
until the time those participants actually retire. In doing
so, the cost of the current force is underestimated.
Pqt> t" j^q lecision ma ^i = ~n to f
u
"i "^ v under 15 tan^ the to ta "l ,"> o s
t
of manpower decisions relating to force structure, an accurate
assessment of the retirement cost implications of policy
alternatives must be included. The method for recognizing
these costs is through allocation of the cost of future retire-
ment benefits by accrual basis accounting. Accrual basis
accounting is presently being used in a portion of the military's
accounting system and the Congressional Budget Office and
General Accounting Office are advocating a switch to accrual
basis accounting for the military retirement system. In light
of this, the emphasis of this study was placed on evaluating
the methods for allocating the cost of future retirement payments
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to the period in which the obligations are incurred instead of
the period in which they may be paid.
The currently accepted method for allocating retirement
costs under accrual basis accounting is through the use of
actuarial cost methods. In order to accurately predict the
cost of future retirement benefits numerous assumptions about
the future must be made. The actuarial assumptions used
include: estimated interest rates, expected future compensation
levels, the expected mortality rate, estimates of the number of
people who will stay until reaching retirement age, and length
of service at time of retirement. Without accurate and on-
going actuarial computations, the allocation of retirement
costs under accural basis accounting become imprecise.
Hicks (1965) in Accounting Research Study No. 3 recognizes
the following actuarial cost methods for use in accrual accounting
of retirement costs; the unit credit cost method, the entry
age normal method, the individual level premium method, the
aggregate method and the attained age normal method. The most
often used method for accounting for the cost of private pension
plans is the entry age normal method.
Most of the actuarial cost methods have been designed
primarily as funding techniques but they also may be used in
allocating costs for accounting purposes. As demonstrated in
Chapter V the entry age normal method is the actuarial cost
method that is the most appropriate for accounting for the cost
of future retirement benefits of the active force. This method
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spreads the cost of retirement benefits over the active work-
life of service members in the form of level annual allocations
of the cost. This method of allocation facilitates the identi-
fication of the total current year's cost of military personnel
for the decision maker.
Two bases of applying the entry age normal method are
recognized, the individual basis and the aggregate basis.
Either of these basis are exceptable methods for calculating
the cost of future retirement benefits. In utilizing either
the individual basis or the aggregate basis, the accuracy
01 the actuarial assumptions used plays an important role in
the accuracy of retirement cost computations. For this reason
actuarial assumptions must be up-dated on a continuing basis
to ensure that accurate information is available for retirement
cost computations.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made:
Recommendation One: Accrual basis accounting should be
adopted for recognizing the cost of military retirement
benefits. This accounting basis would better enable the
decision maker to understand the total current year's cost of
the active military force.
Recommendation Two: An actuarial cost method should be
selected for allocating costs under accrual basis accounting.
A method similar to the entry age normal, individual basis or




DMC FY 1981 VALUATION OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Appendix A is an excerpt of pages 1 to 20 of DMDC's s'X
1981 Valuation of the Military Retirement System.
INTRODUCTION
This documentation summarizes the formal actuarial valuation
of the military retirement system as of 30 September 1981.
Public Law 95-595 required all federal pension systems to adhere
to the reporting requirements of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). All figures included in the fiscal year
1981 report were taken from this valuation and are based on
sound actuarial principles. The military retirement system is
not an old-age pension system normally found in the private
sector and subject to the provisions of ERISA. Rather, it is
a system specifically designed to complement the management of
the active force, and is a function of the military pay and
allowance compensation structure. Notwithstanding these
differentiations in design and purpose, the Department of
Defense adheres to the reporting requirements of ERISA for
the purpose of this report.
The military retirement system is really three separate
but interrelated defined benefit systems: a riondisability
system for retirements from the active service, a nondisabili ty
system for retirements from the reserves, and a disability
retirement system. All three components are unfunded, non-
contributory, and annually increased for inflation after
retirement. Additionally, provision is made for optional
survivor coverage. Military members are not retired in the
traditional sense of the term; they retain military status,
are subject to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, and are
subject to recall to active duty.
Currently, the Service Secretaries approve voluntary
nondisability retirement upon credit of at least 20 years of
service at any age. The retiree from active service receives
an immediate annuity calculated as 2g$ of base pay for each
year of creditable service, subject to a maximum of 75% of
base pay. Base pay is equal to final basic pay if the retiree
first became a member of the Armed Services before 8 September
1980. For those new members after that date, base pay equals
the average of the highest 36 months of pay. A member has




On 30 September 1981, there were 2.1 million active duty
regular and reserve personnel, .9 million selected drill
reservists, 1.1 million retired nondisability annuitants,
.15 million disability annuitants, and 73 thousand survivor
benefit families in the military retirement system. Fiscal
year 1981 retired appropriation outlays totaled $13.7 billion.
The most common age at retirement from active duty is 4-3 for
officers and 39 for enlistees. Excluding reserve retirees,
in September of 1 981 the average gross monthly annuity for
all nondisabled officers was 4)1,751 and nondisabled enlistees
averaged $761 a month.
Valuation results show an aggregate entry-age normal
cost of 1+1.0% of basic pay. This means that for an entering
cohort of servicemen, continuously placing 1+1% of their basic
pay in a fund would be sufficient to pay for future retirement
and survivor benefits of those who eventually qualify for
these benefits. The cost of the present pay-as-you-go method
will ultimately level cut at 5o% of basic pay. All liabilities
relate to the Department of Defense retired pay appropriation
only.
As of September 30, 1981 the entry-age normal cost unfunded
liability is $4.77 billion. This represents the size of the
fund needed to pay for all future retired and survivor benefits,
assuming future continuous payments totaling 4-7.0% of basic
pay are added to the fund. The present value of accumulated
plan benefits for services that have already been rendered is
$378 billion.
Basic pay, or base pay, is the only element of military
compensation upon which military retired pay is computed.
This is the principle element of military compensation which
all members receive; but it is not representative, for compara-
tive purposes, to salary levels in the private or public
sectors. Reasonable comparisons can be made, however, to Easic
Military Compensation (3MC). This is the base level of
compensation received by members and is the sum of basic pay,
the quarters allowance (either cash or in kind), a subsistence
allowance (either cash or in kind), and the federal tax
advantage accruing to allowances since they are not subject
to federal income tax. Consequently, comparisons of military
retired pay to other pension systems must recognize the
relationship to BMC rather to basic pay only.
FUNDING METHOD
Prior to 1935, the Navy had a pension fund (on a nonac-
tuarial basis) which provided for payments to persons retired
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for disability whenever there was a sufficient amount in the
fund. Other retired pay was paid directly from appropriations,
and when the fund was insufficient, the disability retired
pay was also paid from appropriations. The income to the fund
consisted of the government's share of the proceeds from the
sale of enemy or pirate ships captured by the Navy, and from
interest received on fund investments. This fund was abolished
in 1935, and since that time the military retirement system
has been entirely on an unfunded or 'pay-as-you-go' basis.
This valuation will show the unfunded liability under this
funding method, which is just the present value of future
benefits, as well as the unfunded liability under an aggregate
entry-age normal cost funding method.
VALUATION DATA AND PROCEDURE
The valuation input data was abstracted from files main-
tained at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Retiree
and survivor data came from official files submitted by the
Service Finance Centers (Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force)
Quarterly. Reserve data was obtained from the Reserve
Component Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS), the official
source for all Reserve strengths and statistics. Active duty
data came from files provided quarterly by the four military
personnel centers.
The files were aggregated and edited, disregarding invalid
data. Detailed comptroller totals were used on all specific
areas of data to bring the numbers and dollar amounts on the
edited file up to actual size. The blow-up figure was less
than .5% for retirees and .1$ for active duty personnel. The
only area that could not be matched to official DOD figures
is the number of surviving families. This will be resolved
in the future. The total of the survivor annuities was matched
to actual payments.
Dollar amounts included the 1 October pay raise for active
duty and reserve personnel. These totals are summarized in
Table I.
The seriatim method was used in all phases of the valuation
including active, retired, and survivor segments. A model
incorporates all parts of the military retirement system,
including the drill reservists. This captures future liabilities
for those members who leave active duty and later join the
reserves to retain past retirement credits.
An aggregate entry-age normal cost percentage was developed
by dividing the present value of future benefits by the




Initial Accounting Figures as of 30 September 1981




Total Active Duty Personnel + Full
Time Active Duty Reservists
Total Annualized Basic Pay
Total Selected Drill Reservists
Total Annualized Basic Pay
Total Number of Nondisability Retirees
Total Annualized Retired Pay
Total Number of Disability Retirees
Total Annualized Retired Pay-
Total Number of Surviving Families
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starting their careers 021 the valuation data. New entrants
models were created for drill reservists and active duty
personnel using FY80 experience. The models are essentially
arrays indicating what percentage of people enter at each
age and category. Since there were two separate models, the
relative size of the number of new entrants used in each
category was carefully set.
The unfunded liability was defined as the present value
of future benefits minus the present value of future normal
costs for all those currently in the system. This includes
present active duty personnel, drill reservists, retirees,
and survivors, as well as future retirees and future survivors
resulting from this group.
ECONOMIC AND OTHER ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS
The present values shown herein have been determined using
a 5% rate of inflation assumption set by the Office of
Management and Budget. The other economic assumptions, 5.5$
for general salary scale increases (not including merit and
promotion) and 6% for investment return were selected to be
consistent with the Q.5% and 1.0% differentials used by the
Board of Actuaries of the Civil Service Retirement System.
The Board's differentials were based on a study of real
salary growth for Federal employees and real earnings of
Federal securities. The long term nature of pension liabilities
caused the Board to hesitate tc overreact to current high
market yields. The 1950 to 1978 experience was used to
moderate the effect of typical short-term trends. Future
military salary scale increases and the theorectical return
on investments of a military retirement fund will be similar
to the experience of the Civil Service System. Since the
military retirement system is fully indexed, the liabilities
vary only slightly for sets of economic assumptions with the
same differentials.
Military specific death and decrement rates were created
in 1980 using current experience. The rate creation process
was discussed and the rates were published in the FY80 Valuation
of the Militarv Retirement System which is available on
request. An actual/expected study will be made annually
starting with preparation for the FY82 Valuation.
VALUATION RESULTS
Table II summarizes the normal cost findings. The normal
cost as a percent of basic pay for the system as a whole is
4.7/5. Separately, officers have a normal cost of 67% and
enlistees 4-0% of basic pay. These figures contain active
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duty as well as selected drill reservists in the basic pay
figures. The retired pay figures include reserve and active
duty retirees as do the surviving family annuities. The
detailed projections indicated that for a group of new entrants
into the military, 12$ become eligible for nondisability
retirement. 35% of new officers and 11$ of new enlist eds
attain 20 years of service.
Table III summarizes the total present value of future
pay and benefits of $590.4- billion as well as the entry-age
normal cost unfunded liability of $4.76.9 billion. If an accrual
accounting system had been installed as of 30 September 1981,
whereby the normal cost would be placed in a fund annually,
the fund would also need this $476.9 billion lump sum payment
to pay future benefits. An amortization schedule would be
set up to make payments on the $4.76.9 billion over 4-0 or more
years
.
One measure of the funding of a retirement system is the
value of benefits earned to the date of the valuation. As
shown in Table IV, the present value of accumulated plan
benefits as of 30 September 1981 was $377.8 billion.
Accumulated plan benefits are those future periodic pay-
ments that are attributable, under the Plan's provisions, to
the service that military personnel have rendered. Accumulated
plan benefits include benefits expected to be paid to (a)
retired military or their beneficiaries, (b) current benefi-
ciaries, (c) present active duty personnel and nonretired
reservists or their beneficiaries. Benefits payable under all
circumstances (retirement, Disability, and survivor) are
included to the extent they are deemed attributable to service
rendered prior to the valuation date. No future salary
increases are used but annuities are increased in line with
the post-retirement inflation provision.
The actuarial present value of accumulated plan benefits
is that amount that results from applying actuarial assumptions
to adjust the accumulated plan benefits to reflect the time
value of money (through discounts for interest) and the
probability of payment (by means of decrements such as for
death, disability, withdrawal, or retirement) between the
valuation date and the expected date of payment. The actuarial
assumptions are based on the presumption that the Plan will
continue. Were the Plan to terminate, different actuarial
assumptions and other factors might be applicable in determining
the actuarial present value of accumulated plan benefits.






PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE BASE FAY Sept 30, 1981
Active Duty:
Regular Officers $ 65.2
Nonregular Officers 19.7
Regular Enlisteds 134.. 9
Nonregular Enlisteds 3.9





Selected Reservists Subtotal $ 17.3
Total Present Value of Future Basic Pay $24.1.5
PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE BENEFITS






Current and Future Surviving Families:
Surviving Families $ 28.3
Total Present Value of Future Benefits $590.-4
Normal Cost % 47.0
Pay-As-You-Go Liability $590. I
Present Value of Future Normal Costs $113.5
Entry-Age-Normal Cost Liability $4-76.9
Fund Balance 0.0
Pay-As-You-Go Unfunded Liability $590.4-







PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE BENEFITS













Surviving Families Subtotal $ 22.6
Total Present Value of Future Benefits $377.8
PRESENT VALUE OF VESTED AND NONVSSTED BENEFITS**
Participants Currently Receiving Payments $273.7
Other Vested Participants 54.. 4-
Vested Benefits Subtotal $328.1
Non-Vested Benefits $ 49.7
Total Present Value of Future Benefits $377.8
'81
*The decrease in accumulated liability for SBP was primarily
due to an increase in Veterans Administration Offset assumptions
for survivor annuities.
'•'"-"Military members are not vested in the military retire-
ment system. For the purpose of this chart only, a nonretired
vested participant is defined as an active duty member with




A formal gain and loss analysis program has not yet been
developed for the military retirement system, so extensive
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TABLE V
Analysis of Change in Normal Cost Percentage















Two other actuarial assumption changes were made that had
insignificant impacts on normal cost, but that affected the
accumulated plan benefits as well as the present value of
future benefits for the plan participants. Both of these
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assumption changes were the result of fine-tuning reserve
retirement projections. The number of members reentering
service by transferring from active duty to reserve duty
increased as well as the number of reserve retirements from
a non-pay status.
Table VI analyzes the change in accumulated plan benefits
from September 1 98 Q to September 1981.
TABLE VI
Statement of Changes in Accumulated Plan Benefits
($ in billions)
I. Actuarial present value of accumulated
plan benefits on September 50, 1 980 $348.9
II. Increases (decreases) during the year
attributed to:
A. Actuarial Assumptions $ 5.6
"
;;" Increase in career salary rates $ .7




B. Plan Changes $ (4.. 4-)
Rounding of Service $( .7)
Once-a-year Cost-of-Living (3.7)
C. Benefits Accumulated
and Actuarial Gain or Less $ 27.7
III. Actuarial present value of accumulated
plan benefits on September 30, 1981 $377.8
'"" Direct impact of variable pay increase for enlisteds
in October 1981
.
The $27.7 billion associated with the increase in accumulated
plan benefits due to the FY81 accumulation and actuarial gain
and loss was derived by balancing the equation on Table VI.
The following independent analysis shows that it is close to
the total that would have been produced had we had a formal
gain and loss program. The monthly total basic pay increased
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17.4$ between October 1980 and October 1931 due to changes in
force size structure and the October 1930 basic pay rise.
This pay rise was 14.. 3$ for officers but varied for enlisted.
Enlisted increases ranged from 10$ at the lower ranks to 17$
at the higher ranks. Higher rank increases have the most
impact on retired pay since rcndisability retirees are at those
ranks when they retire. The monthly total retired pay increased
5.8$ during this period. This was a result of the March 1981
cost-of-living increase of 4-. 4-$ and the growth in the retired
population.
The actuarial present value of benefits in retired and
survivor pay status was $261.6 billion on September 30, 1980.
Multiplying this by the 5.8$ gives us an increase of $1 4- • 9
billion. Likewise, the active duty future liabilities of
$4-5.6 and $4-1.7 can be increased by the 17.4-$. These figures
all total $30.1. Analysis indicated that the average age of
the retired population went up during FY81 . Consequently, the
hypothetical $14.9 billion increase in retired liability
mentioned above should be lowered. This adjustment would
place the $30.1 billion closer to the $27.7 figure obtained
by balancing. Many other variables affect gain and loss,
but without an analysis program the pieces cannot be individually
analyzed. D0D plans to build this type of program for future
use. Table VII analyzes the change in the present value of
future benefits from September 1980 to September 1981. Just
as discussed in the prior section on accumulated plan benefits,
it can be shown that the $58.0 billion increase in the pay-
as-you-go unfunded liability in line II. C resulted mainly
from increases in active duty and retired retainer pay and
population size in FY31 .
LONG-TERM ANALYSIS
Assuming a level active duty force, total basic pay and
retired appropriation outlays are projected 75 years into the
future in Table VIII. The figures are placed into perspective
by the outlays over pay ratios. It should be noted that this
ratio peaks at 64.$ in the year 2000 and then drops to 56$
in 2032 where it remains level. This ultimate 56$ should be
compared to the ultimate 47$ under a funded entry-age normal
cost method. A good argument for remaining unfunded could
be made with only a 9$ difference in ultimate budget outlays.
The economic assumptions used in the projection are indicated
on the bottom of Table VIII. Short-term assumptions were








Actuarial present value of future plan
benefits on Sept. 30, 1980
Increases (decreases) during the year
attributed to:
A. Actuarial Assumptions
'""Increase in career salary rates $2.7
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C. Benefits Accumulated and
Actuarial Gain or Loss
Actuarial present value of future














Total Past and Projected Basic Pay




Year Basic Pay Outlays
1980 $ 20.9 $11.9
1981 23.5 13.7
-1982 27.6 15.1
1983 29.7 1 o. o
1984 32.0 17.9
19 85 33.8 19.2
1986 35.7 20.5
1937 37.7 21 .3
1 9 8 3 . - . c
1989 42.0 Zl.S
1990 44.3 2 6.4
1991 46.8 28.1
1992 49.4 30.0
1993 52.1 31 .8
199-4 55.0 33.8
1995 58.0 35.9
1996 61 .2 38.0
1997 64.5 40.4
1998 67.9 42.8





2016 1 76.6 106.2
2021 230.8 135.1







































Projected from this year on
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The Department of Defense is sponsoring a legislative
proposal that would essentially place the military retirement
system on an entry-age normal cost funding method. The proposal
calls for the normal cost, as well as a payment on the unfunded
liability, to be placed into a fund each year. These combined
payments are referred to as the ''retired pay cost". The method
and length of amortization is not precisely defined.
Under an entry-age normal method, when salaries are assumed
to increase, the normal cost is defined not as a level dollar
amount payable each year, but as a level percentage of salary
or the compensation item upon which pensions are based. This
spreads the payments out so that the financial impact is a
uniform percentage of salary in all years. Since the military
compensation system is one of pay and allowances rather than
a salary, basic pay is the compensation item used to determine
costs of the military retirement system. Likewise, using
level dollar amortization of the unfunded liability when
annuities are tied to CFI and salary increases creates an
early year financial burden and misunderstandings of the true
cost of the system. Amortization of the unfunded liability
as a level percent of basic pay is a more defensible approach.
Table IX shows the accrual cost associated with the normal
cost of 1+1% and the unfunded liability of $4.76.9 billion for
three different amortization periods » all as a level percent
of basic pay. The Fiscal year 1982 costs range from $21 to
$26 billion or $6 to $11 billion more than the current cost.
If the unfunded liability had been amortized over 4-0
years in equal dollar payments, the level annual payment would
be $29.9 billion. This would have resulted in a total 1982
accrual cost of $4-2.9 billion or $27.8 billion over the actual
outlays of $15.1 billion. This level of funding is not only
unnecessary but misleading since the cost would drop rapidly
to 4-7$ of basic pay. Table X shows txhe cost of retirement as
a percent of basic pay under three scenarios; retired pay
costs with 4-0 year level amortization, retired pay costs with
4.0 year amortization as a level percent of basic pay, and the




In the private sector the question of funding is simply
one of recognizing that the true cost of a pension plan must
be paid during the working lifetimes of the employees who
will ultimately receive the benefit. Likewise, on the surface
it would appear that the question of funding the military
retirement system is simply one of allocating tax monies to
a fund from a designated generation of taxpayers. Today,
allocation of costs among taxpayers is complicated by the
fact that such a fund would be a part of the Unified Budget




Military Retirement Appropriation Accrual Costs
($ in billions)
4.0 Year Amortization as % of Basic Pav Scale Increases
Est* Payment, Total Total ^dded
Basic N ormai on Accrual Est C ost of
FY Pay Cost Unfunded Cost Outlays A ccrual
82 $ 27.6 $ 1 3.0 $ 13.1 $ 26.1 $ 1 5.1 11.0
83 29.7 1 4.0 13.8 27.8 16.6 11.2
84 32.0 15.0 1 4.6 29.6 1 7.9 11.7
85 33.8 15.9 1 5.4 31 .3 19.2 12.1
86 35.7 16.8 16.3 33.1 20.5 12.6
87 37.7 1 7.7 1 7.1 34.8 21 .8 13.0
60 Year Amortization as % of Basic Pay Scale Increases
Est* Payment Total P „ + Q I1 O OO.J. Added
Basic Normal on Accrual Est Cost of
FY Pay Cost Unfunded Cost 0i.itlays Accrual
82 $ 2 7.6 $ 13.0 $ 9.2 $ 22.2 $ 1 5.1 $ 7.1
33 29.7 14.0 9.7 ^ rj 16.6 7.1
34 32.0 1 5.0 1 0.2 25.2 17.9 7.3
85 33.8 1 5.9 10.8 26.7 19.2 7.5
86 35.7 16.3 11.4 28.2 20.5 7.7
37 37.7 17.7 12.0 29.7 21 .3 7.9
75 Year Amortization as % of Basic Pay Scale Increases
Est* Pa.yment Total Total Added
Basic Normal on Accrual Est Cost of
FY Pay Cost Un funded Cost Outlays Accrual
8 2 $ 27.6 $ 13.0 $ 7.6 $ 20.6 $ 15.1 $ 5.5
83 29.7 1 4.0 8.0 22.0 16.6 5.4
34 32.0 1 5.0 8.5 23.5 1 7.9 5.6
35 33.8 15.9 3.9 24.8 19.2 5.6
86 35.7 16.3 9.4 26.2 20.5 5.7
37 37.7 1 7.7 9.9 27.6 21 .8 5.8
"^Includes basic pay to active duty and selected reserves.
Unfunded Liability = $476.9 billion




Total Retired Pay Costs as a Percent of Basic Pay
Cost With
Cost With 40 40 Y ear Level Present
Year Level % of Basic Pay Pay-As-You-Go
FY Amortization Amor tization Cost
1982 155% 95% 55%
1983 U8 94 56
1984 uo 93 56
1985 136 93 57
1986 131 93 57
1991 111 92 60
1996 96 92 62
2001 85 93 64
2206 76 93 64
2011 69 93 62
2016 64 93 60
2021 60 92 59
2026 47 47 57
2031 ^7 / n 57
2036 kl 47 56
114.

general revenues or agencies are intergovernmental transfers
with no impact on the Federal surplus or deficit. Since
taxes are set, at least in theory, relative to a certain
desired level of surplus or deficit, and since retirement fund
transfers would not affect this amount, current taxes would
not be affected by additional payments from general revenues
to a military retirement system fund.
The added cost of accrual accounting in any year would be
a general revenue expenditure but, at the same time, it would
be retirement fund income. The two transactions would cancel
each other out with no effect on the deficit. To complete
the circle, the Treasury would increase the amount of bonds to
meet this extra cost and the fund would purchase bonds of
equivalent value. The total privately-held debt would not
change. However, the total debt would increase and this might
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